竞争与资源分配:权利和自我选择效应的实验分析

IF 2.3 3区 经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS
Katarína Čellárová , Rostislav Staněk
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引用次数: 0

摘要

决定资源分配的领导人往往是通过竞争产生的。由于监督不完善,他们往往决定将资源分配给自己,而牺牲其他人的利益。本文研究了在竞争中被选中如何通过两个渠道影响资源分配:权利效应和自我选择效应。在我们的实验中,两个参与者竞争在自己和第三个未参与的参与者之间分配资源的权利。我们通过比较参与竞赛的参与者和随机选择的参与者的选择来确定权利效应。自我选择效应则是通过差分法比较优胜者和失败者的选择来确定的。我们发现,权利效应非常明显;与未参加比赛的人相比,参加比赛的人向第三名选手转移的资源较少。此外,我们没有发现任何证据表明,具有特定分配偏好的人会自我选择成为领导者。我们的研究结果表明,领导者将资源分配给自己的主要原因是他们参与了竞赛,而不是自我选择的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effect by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
10.00%
发文量
106
期刊介绍: The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).
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