法院、立法机构和不断演变的财产规则:征用权的经验教训

IF 2.6 1区 历史学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Robert K. Fleck, F. Andrew Hanssen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

利益抵消是 19 世纪铁路公司广泛采用的一种通过征用土地减少所需补偿的方法。在铁路繁荣之初,所有州都允许利益抵消;到繁荣结束时,大多数州都禁止了利益抵消,有些州是通过法院判决,有些州是通过立法。与法院和立法机构作为公众代理人(不完全)的简单模式一致:1) 对福利抵消的质疑通常始于诉讼;2) 所有提起诉讼的州最终都限制了抵消,但并不总是通过诉讼;3) 在法院选择允许抵消的情况下,立法也限制了抵消,但往往有很大的滞后性;4) 这些滞后性往往更长(即,从诉讼到随后的立法之间的时间更长)、4) 当诉讼工作发生在轨道建设过程的早期(此时抵消更有可能具有社会价值)时,这些滞后期往往更长(即诉讼与后续立法之间的时间间隔更长);5)从未禁止效益抵消的州是那些土地所有者不太可能受到这种做法损害的州(主要是拥有大片公共和私人土地的西部各州)。该模型和历史证据说明了一个同时赋予法院和立法机构改变财产规则的权力的制度是如何建立一种有益的冗余,从而提高可修改财产规则的价值的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Courts, legislatures, and evolving property rules: Lessons from eminent domain

This paper examines judicial and legislative modifications to a specific property rule, the benefit offset, which was widely employed by railroad companies during the 19th century as a way to reduce required compensation for land taken through eminent domain. At the beginning of the railroad boom, all states allowed the benefit offset; by the end of the boom, most states had banned it, some via court decisions, others via legislation. Consistent with a simple model in which a court and a legislature act as (imperfect) agents of the public: 1) challenges to the benefit offset generally began with litigation; 2) all states that litigated the offset eventually restricted it, but not always through litigation; 3) where courts chose to allow the offset, legislation restricted it, often with substantial lags; 4) those lags tended to be longer (i.e., more time passed between litigation and subsequent legislation) when the litigation efforts took place early in the track building process (at which time the offset was more likely to be socially valuable); 5) states that never banned the benefit offset were those where landowners were unlikely to have ever been harmed by the practice (principally western states with vast expanses of public and private land). The model and historical evidence illustrate how a system that grants both the court and the legislature the power to alter property rules can establish a beneficial redundancy that increases the value of modifiable property rules.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
8.70%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: Explorations in Economic History provides broad coverage of the application of economic analysis to historical episodes. The journal has a tradition of innovative applications of theory and quantitative techniques, and it explores all aspects of economic change, all historical periods, all geographical locations, and all political and social systems. The journal includes papers by economists, economic historians, demographers, geographers, and sociologists. Explorations in Economic History is the only journal where you will find "Essays in Exploration." This unique department alerts economic historians to the potential in a new area of research, surveying the recent literature and then identifying the most promising issues to pursue.
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