基于像素梯度的 DNN 增强凝聚后门攻击

IF 2.6 4区 计算机科学 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Jianyao Yin, Honglong Chen, Junjian Li, Yudong Gao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

深度学习已被广泛应用于人脸识别、自动驾驶等许多领域。然而,深度学习模型很容易受到各种对抗性攻击,其中后门攻击是最近才出现的。现有的后门攻击大多使用相同的触发器或相同的触发器生成方法来生成训练集和测试集中的中毒样本,这也是许多后门防御策略普遍采用的方法。本文开发了一种增强型后门攻击(EBA),旨在揭示现有后门防御方法的潜在缺陷。我们使用低强度触发器嵌入后门,同时使用高强度触发器激活后门。此外,我们还提出了一种增强型聚合后门攻击(ECBA),即设计多个低强度萌发触发器来训练后门模型,然后将所有萌发触发器聚集在一个样本上并增强以发起攻击。在三个流行数据集上的实验结果表明,我们提出的攻击能在保持良样本的模型分类准确性的同时实现较高的攻击成功率。同时,通过隐藏初生中毒样本并防止它们激活后门,所提出的攻击具有显著的隐蔽性,能够在模型训练阶段躲避主流防御方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Enhanced Coalescence Backdoor Attack Against DNN Based on Pixel Gradient

Enhanced Coalescence Backdoor Attack Against DNN Based on Pixel Gradient

Deep learning has been widely used in many applications such as face recognition, autonomous driving, etc. However, deep learning models are vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, among which backdoor attack is emerging recently. Most of the existing backdoor attacks use the same trigger or the same trigger generation approach to generate the poisoned samples in the training and testing sets, which is also commonly adopted by many backdoor defense strategies. In this paper, we develop an enhanced backdoor attack (EBA) that aims to reveal the potential flaws of existing backdoor defense methods. We use a low-intensity trigger to embed the backdoor, while a high-intensity trigger to activate it. Furthermore, we propose an enhanced coalescence backdoor attack (ECBA) where multiple low-intensity incipient triggers are designed to train the backdoor model, and then, all incipient triggers are gathered on one sample and enhanced to launch the attack. Experiment results on three popular datasets show that our proposed attacks can achieve high attack success rates while maintaining the model classification accuracy of benign samples. Meanwhile, by hiding the incipient poisoned samples and preventing them from activating the backdoor, the proposed attack exhibits significant stealth and the ability to evade mainstream defense methods during the model training phase.

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来源期刊
Neural Processing Letters
Neural Processing Letters 工程技术-计算机:人工智能
CiteScore
4.90
自引率
12.90%
发文量
392
审稿时长
2.8 months
期刊介绍: Neural Processing Letters is an international journal publishing research results and innovative ideas on all aspects of artificial neural networks. Coverage includes theoretical developments, biological models, new formal modes, learning, applications, software and hardware developments, and prospective researches. The journal promotes fast exchange of information in the community of neural network researchers and users. The resurgence of interest in the field of artificial neural networks since the beginning of the 1980s is coupled to tremendous research activity in specialized or multidisciplinary groups. Research, however, is not possible without good communication between people and the exchange of information, especially in a field covering such different areas; fast communication is also a key aspect, and this is the reason for Neural Processing Letters
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