Judging the guilt of the un-guilty: The roles of “false positive” guilt and empathy in moral character perception

When people accidentally harm others, some theory anticipates that expressing normatively unexpected (“false positive”) guilt is socially functional because it signals a positive moral character and likability. Although previous evidence shows anticipated effects of false positive guilt on these outcomes, it is possible these effects result from perceiving aspects specific to empathy (vs. guilt). We address this possibility in three preregistered studies. Participants answered questions regarding their perceptions of agents of accidental harm. In Experiment 1 (N = 299), agents that expressed guilt (vs. no guilt) received higher moral character and likability ratings; mediation evidence suggested these effects resulted via perceptions that the agent experienced empathy-specific (e.g., concern, understanding), not guilt-specific (e.g., self-blame) sentiments; if anything, guilt-specific sentiments reduced some moral character evaluations. Experiment 2 (N = 503) was a conceptual replication with more ecologically valid methods; it provided similar conclusions. Experiment 3 (N = 653) crossed an agent's expression of guilt-specific sentiments (present vs. absent) with empathy-specific sentiments (present vs. absent). Main effects of empathy-specific sentiments on moral character and likability judgments were at least seven times larger than those attributed to guilt-specific sentiments. Additionally, when empathy-specific sentiments were expressed, the expression of guilt-specific sentiments had no positive effects on moral character and likability judgments; however, when empathy-specific sentiments were not expressed, the expression of guilt-specific sentiments enhanced some but not all moral character judgments. We discuss how our findings contribute to understanding the social benefits of expressing false positive guilt and cohere with some impression formation perspectives.