业绩解释是可信的还是战略性的?来自大量 MD&As 样本的证据1

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Sabrina Gong, Yamin Hao, Xiaojia Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了大量年度报告中管理层讨论与分析(MD&A)部分中管理者对公司业绩的解释(即管理归因)。我们发现,业绩不佳公司的管理者倾向于将公司业绩归因于外部因素。我们进一步提出了一个预测模型,将管理层的外部归因分解为可信部分和战略部分,并发现这两个部分都与公司业绩负相关。这一证据表明,管理层的外部归因部分反映了外部条件对公司业绩的实际影响,并不完全受制于管理机会主义。此外,我们还发现,当管理者提供可信的外部归因时,投资者对公司业绩的反应更为强烈,尤其是那些在战略性外部归因方面没有坏名声的公司。我们还发现,当管理者做出更多战略性外部归因时,高管薪酬对公司业绩的敏感度较低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Are performance explanations credible or strategic? Evidence from a large sample of MD&As1

This paper examines managers’ explanations of firm performance (i.e., management attributions) in a large sample of the Management's Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of annual reports. We find that managers of poorly performing firms tend to attribute firm performance to external factors. We further propose a prediction model to decompose management external attributions into a credible part and a strategic part and find that both components are negatively related to firm performance. This evidence suggests that management external attributions partially reflect the actual impact of external conditions on firm performance and are not entirely subject to managerial opportunism. Additionally, we find that investors react more strongly to firm performance when managers provide credible external attributions, especially for firms without a bad reputation for strategic external attributions. We also show that executive compensation is less sensitive to firm performance when managers make more strategic external attributions.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
69
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