管理者报酬、公司杠杆和信贷刺激模型

IF 6.1 2区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Rajdeep Chakraborti , Sandeep Dahiya , Lei Ge , Pedro Gete
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了一个模型,在这个模型中,杠杆率和薪酬都是企业的选择变量,而借贷利差是内生的。首先,我们分析了杠杆率与可变薪酬之间的相关性。我们发现,允许报酬和杠杆内生可以解释实证文献中相互矛盾的结论。我们发现了努力与杠杆之间互补的新渠道,它导致了与当前理论模型预测相反的相关符号。其次,我们研究了信贷刺激后杠杆和薪酬设计的动态变化。我们得出了一系列新的经验预测。在信贷供给外移的情况下,可变报酬会随着杠杆率的增长而增加。此外,可变薪酬在信贷刺激后也会增加,特别是对于特异性风险较低的企业。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A model of managerial compensation, firm leverage and credit stimulus

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for endogenous compensation and leverage can explain the conflicting findings of the empirical literature. We uncover a new channel of complementarity between effort and leverage that induces a correlation sign opposite to what current theoretical models predict. Second, we study the dynamics of leverage and compensation design after a credit stimulus. We derive a set of new empirical predictions. For outward-shifts in credit supply, variable compensation is increasing in leverage growth. Moreover, variable compensation increases after the credit stimulus, especially for firms with low idiosyncratic risk.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.70
自引率
9.30%
发文量
78
审稿时长
34 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Stability provides an international forum for rigorous theoretical and empirical macro and micro economic and financial analysis of the causes, management, resolution and preventions of financial crises, including banking, securities market, payments and currency crises. The primary focus is on applied research that would be useful in affecting public policy with respect to financial stability. Thus, the Journal seeks to promote interaction among researchers, policy-makers and practitioners to identify potential risks to financial stability and develop means for preventing, mitigating or managing these risks both within and across countries.
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