{"title":"短暂情绪发作对情感和认知心智理论的影响。","authors":"Emilie Qiao-Tasserit, Corrado Corradi-Dell'Acqua, Patrik Vuilleumier","doi":"10.1093/scan/nsae016","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Our emotions may influence how we interact with others. Previous studies have shown an important role of emotion induction in generating empathic reactions towards others' affect. However, it remains unclear whether (and to which extent) our own emotions can influence the ability to infer people's mental states, a process associated with Theory of Mind (ToM) and implicated in the representation of both cognitive (e.g. beliefs and intentions) and affective conditions. We engaged 59 participants in two emotion-induction experiments where they saw joyful, neutral and fearful clips. Subsequently, they were asked to infer other individuals' joy, fear (affective ToM) or beliefs (cognitive ToM) from verbal scenarios. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that brain activity in the superior temporal gyrus, precuneus and sensorimotor cortices were modulated by the preceding emotional induction, with lower response when the to-be-inferred emotion was incongruent with the one induced in the observer (affective ToM). Instead, we found no effect of emotion induction on the appraisal of people's beliefs (cognitive ToM). These findings are consistent with embodied accounts of affective ToM, whereby our own emotions alter the engagement of key brain regions for social cognition, depending on the compatibility between one's own and others' affect.</p>","PeriodicalId":94208,"journal":{"name":"Social cognitive and affective neuroscience","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10914405/pdf/","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Influence of transient emotional episodes on affective and cognitive theory of mind.\",\"authors\":\"Emilie Qiao-Tasserit, Corrado Corradi-Dell'Acqua, Patrik Vuilleumier\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/scan/nsae016\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p><p>Our emotions may influence how we interact with others. Previous studies have shown an important role of emotion induction in generating empathic reactions towards others' affect. However, it remains unclear whether (and to which extent) our own emotions can influence the ability to infer people's mental states, a process associated with Theory of Mind (ToM) and implicated in the representation of both cognitive (e.g. beliefs and intentions) and affective conditions. We engaged 59 participants in two emotion-induction experiments where they saw joyful, neutral and fearful clips. Subsequently, they were asked to infer other individuals' joy, fear (affective ToM) or beliefs (cognitive ToM) from verbal scenarios. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that brain activity in the superior temporal gyrus, precuneus and sensorimotor cortices were modulated by the preceding emotional induction, with lower response when the to-be-inferred emotion was incongruent with the one induced in the observer (affective ToM). Instead, we found no effect of emotion induction on the appraisal of people's beliefs (cognitive ToM). These findings are consistent with embodied accounts of affective ToM, whereby our own emotions alter the engagement of key brain regions for social cognition, depending on the compatibility between one's own and others' affect.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":94208,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Social cognitive and affective neuroscience\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10914405/pdf/\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Social cognitive and affective neuroscience\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsae016\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Social cognitive and affective neuroscience","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsae016","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
我们的情绪可能会影响我们与他人的互动方式。以往的研究表明,情绪诱导在对他人的情绪产生移情反应方面发挥着重要作用。然而,我们自己的情绪是否(以及在多大程度上)会影响推断他人心理状态的能力(这是一个与心智理论(ToM)相关的过程,并与认知(如信念和意图)和情感条件的表征有关),目前仍不清楚。我们让 59 名参与者参加了两项情绪诱导实验,让他们观看欢乐、中性和恐惧片段。随后,他们被要求从语言情景中推断其他人的快乐、恐惧(情感 ToM)或信念(认知 ToM)。通过功能磁共振成像,我们发现颞上回、楔前区和感觉运动皮层的大脑活动受之前情绪诱导的调节,当被推断的情绪与观察者被诱导的情绪不一致时(情感性 ToM),大脑的反应较低。相反,我们发现情绪诱导对人们的信念评估(认知 ToM)没有影响。这些发现与情感性 ToM 的具身说法一致,即我们自身的情感会改变社会认知关键脑区的参与,这取决于自身情感与他人情感之间的兼容性。
Influence of transient emotional episodes on affective and cognitive theory of mind.
Our emotions may influence how we interact with others. Previous studies have shown an important role of emotion induction in generating empathic reactions towards others' affect. However, it remains unclear whether (and to which extent) our own emotions can influence the ability to infer people's mental states, a process associated with Theory of Mind (ToM) and implicated in the representation of both cognitive (e.g. beliefs and intentions) and affective conditions. We engaged 59 participants in two emotion-induction experiments where they saw joyful, neutral and fearful clips. Subsequently, they were asked to infer other individuals' joy, fear (affective ToM) or beliefs (cognitive ToM) from verbal scenarios. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that brain activity in the superior temporal gyrus, precuneus and sensorimotor cortices were modulated by the preceding emotional induction, with lower response when the to-be-inferred emotion was incongruent with the one induced in the observer (affective ToM). Instead, we found no effect of emotion induction on the appraisal of people's beliefs (cognitive ToM). These findings are consistent with embodied accounts of affective ToM, whereby our own emotions alter the engagement of key brain regions for social cognition, depending on the compatibility between one's own and others' affect.