{"title":"火力:武器如何塑造战争》,保罗-洛克哈特著(评论)","authors":"Kaushik Roy","doi":"10.1353/tech.2024.a920568","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p> <span>Reviewed by:</span> <ul> <li><!-- html_title --> <em>Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare</em> by Paul Lockhart <!-- /html_title --></li> <li> Kaushik Roy (bio) </li> </ul> <em>Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare</em> By Paul Lockhart. New York: Basic Books, 2021. Pp. xii + 624. <p>Gunpowder changed the course of warfare and, ipso facto, global history. The advocates of the Military Revolution thesis (starting from Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker's <em>The Military Revolution</em>, 1988) argue along this line. Even if one challenges this \"big\" assertion, there is no denying that gunpowder weaponries definitely constitute a break with the medieval past. There are some sophisticated global surveys about the history of the interrelationship between the changing contours of war and the evolution of military technology (for instance, Martin van Creveld's <em>Technology and War</em>, 1989; Trevor N. Dupuy's <em>The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare</em>, 1990; and Jeremy Black's <em>War and Technology</em>, 2013, among others). However, such broad-range accounts provide few details about how the different weapons worked. On the other hand, we have monographs detailing the characteristics of particular weapon systems like AK-47s, Tiger tanks, etc. Such microstudies with a wealth of technical information interest only collectors of weapons and military buffs. Interested educated readers and historians are thus left hanging between broad-brush treatments of weapon systems at one pole and microstudies of specific weapons at the other.</p> <p>In the voluminous work under review, Paul Lockhart, professor of history at Wright State University, fills this vacuum. He turns the focus on the technicalities of the weapons that made up the era of gunpowder warfare during the last 600 years. He begins in circa 1400 and ends with the end of the Cold War. To avoid the barrage of criticisms that Parker and W. H. McNeill (for his <em>The Pursuit of Power</em>, 1982) received, Lockhart limits his gaze to Western Europe and the United States. Rightly he says that the 1980s marked the end of the dominance of gunpowder weapons and the 1990s saw the beginning of the Information Revolution, which resulted in the primacy of networking of information systems, with firepower taking a secondary role in war. <strong>[End Page 431]</strong></p> <p>Lots of information regarding the arms and munitions used in the three domains (air, land, and sea) is pounded on the readers analytically and succinctly. Lockhart tells us concisely about the characteristics of the important weapons, how they worked, and why they were being replaced by other weapon systems. We get a clear idea of a matchlock and why it was replaced by a musket in the sixteenth century, the difference between breechloaders and muzzleloaders, the shift from black powder to smokeless powder toward the end of the nineteenth century, the transition from coal to oil engines at the beginning of the twentieth century, the distinction between a bolt-action rifle and an assault rifle, etc. Credit is due to Lockhart for showing the interaction between the development of weapon systems and the transformation of tactics. For instance, while the musket gave rise to linear warfare, rifles necessitated the advent of skirmishers.</p> <p>Besides telling us how and why different weapon systems became dominant in particular time periods, Lockhart also puts forward a macroargument. <em>Firepower</em> persuasively argues that states with a greater manufacturing base and standard-quality weapons in large numbers won wars against powers that deployed cutting-edge weaponry in limited numbers. Lockhart's analysis is more nuanced than Paul Kennedy's straightforward argument in <em>The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</em> (1987) that the country with the biggest economic base comes out victorious. Richard Overy's case study of World War II in <em>Why the Allies Won</em> (1995) showed that the Nazis—despite deploying qualitatively superior weapon systems—were defeated by the Allies due to their quantitative superiority. Lockhart extends this model throughout the last 600 years of Western history.</p> <p>A critique might be that <em>Firepower</em> smacks of soft technological determinism. Lockhart does not consider social and cultural mores in shaping the upgradation of gunpowder weapons and their deployments. But this entertaining, valuable book is a must for educated lay readers, as well as for serious students of military technology. <strong>[End Page 432]</strong></p> Kaushik Roy <p>Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor in the Department of History at Jadavpur...</p> </p>","PeriodicalId":49446,"journal":{"name":"Technology and Culture","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare by Paul Lockhart (review)\",\"authors\":\"Kaushik Roy\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/tech.2024.a920568\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p> <span>Reviewed by:</span> <ul> <li><!-- html_title --> <em>Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare</em> by Paul Lockhart <!-- /html_title --></li> <li> Kaushik Roy (bio) </li> </ul> <em>Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare</em> By Paul Lockhart. New York: Basic Books, 2021. Pp. xii + 624. <p>Gunpowder changed the course of warfare and, ipso facto, global history. The advocates of the Military Revolution thesis (starting from Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker's <em>The Military Revolution</em>, 1988) argue along this line. Even if one challenges this \\\"big\\\" assertion, there is no denying that gunpowder weaponries definitely constitute a break with the medieval past. There are some sophisticated global surveys about the history of the interrelationship between the changing contours of war and the evolution of military technology (for instance, Martin van Creveld's <em>Technology and War</em>, 1989; Trevor N. Dupuy's <em>The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare</em>, 1990; and Jeremy Black's <em>War and Technology</em>, 2013, among others). However, such broad-range accounts provide few details about how the different weapons worked. On the other hand, we have monographs detailing the characteristics of particular weapon systems like AK-47s, Tiger tanks, etc. Such microstudies with a wealth of technical information interest only collectors of weapons and military buffs. Interested educated readers and historians are thus left hanging between broad-brush treatments of weapon systems at one pole and microstudies of specific weapons at the other.</p> <p>In the voluminous work under review, Paul Lockhart, professor of history at Wright State University, fills this vacuum. He turns the focus on the technicalities of the weapons that made up the era of gunpowder warfare during the last 600 years. He begins in circa 1400 and ends with the end of the Cold War. To avoid the barrage of criticisms that Parker and W. H. McNeill (for his <em>The Pursuit of Power</em>, 1982) received, Lockhart limits his gaze to Western Europe and the United States. Rightly he says that the 1980s marked the end of the dominance of gunpowder weapons and the 1990s saw the beginning of the Information Revolution, which resulted in the primacy of networking of information systems, with firepower taking a secondary role in war. <strong>[End Page 431]</strong></p> <p>Lots of information regarding the arms and munitions used in the three domains (air, land, and sea) is pounded on the readers analytically and succinctly. Lockhart tells us concisely about the characteristics of the important weapons, how they worked, and why they were being replaced by other weapon systems. We get a clear idea of a matchlock and why it was replaced by a musket in the sixteenth century, the difference between breechloaders and muzzleloaders, the shift from black powder to smokeless powder toward the end of the nineteenth century, the transition from coal to oil engines at the beginning of the twentieth century, the distinction between a bolt-action rifle and an assault rifle, etc. Credit is due to Lockhart for showing the interaction between the development of weapon systems and the transformation of tactics. For instance, while the musket gave rise to linear warfare, rifles necessitated the advent of skirmishers.</p> <p>Besides telling us how and why different weapon systems became dominant in particular time periods, Lockhart also puts forward a macroargument. <em>Firepower</em> persuasively argues that states with a greater manufacturing base and standard-quality weapons in large numbers won wars against powers that deployed cutting-edge weaponry in limited numbers. Lockhart's analysis is more nuanced than Paul Kennedy's straightforward argument in <em>The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers</em> (1987) that the country with the biggest economic base comes out victorious. Richard Overy's case study of World War II in <em>Why the Allies Won</em> (1995) showed that the Nazis—despite deploying qualitatively superior weapon systems—were defeated by the Allies due to their quantitative superiority. Lockhart extends this model throughout the last 600 years of Western history.</p> <p>A critique might be that <em>Firepower</em> smacks of soft technological determinism. Lockhart does not consider social and cultural mores in shaping the upgradation of gunpowder weapons and their deployments. But this entertaining, valuable book is a must for educated lay readers, as well as for serious students of military technology. <strong>[End Page 432]</strong></p> Kaushik Roy <p>Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor in the Department of History at Jadavpur...</p> </p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":49446,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Technology and Culture\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-29\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Technology and Culture\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/tech.2024.a920568\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Technology and Culture","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/tech.2024.a920568","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
评论者 Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare by Paul Lockhart Kaushik Roy (bio) Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare By Paul Lockhart.纽约:Basic Books, 2021.第 xii + 624 页。火药改变了战争的进程,当然也改变了全球历史。军事革命论(始于迈克尔-罗伯茨和杰弗里-帕克的著作《军事革命》,1988 年)的倡导者都是这样论证的。即使有人对这一 "重大 "论断提出质疑,但不可否认的是,火药武器绝对是对中世纪过去的一种突破。关于战争轮廓的变化与军事技术演变之间相互关系的历史,有一些复杂的全球性研究(例如,马丁-范-克雷弗尔德的《技术与战争》,1989 年;特雷弗-N-杜普伊的《武器与战争的演变》,1990 年;杰里米-布莱克的《战争与技术》,2013 年等)。然而,这些大范围的描述几乎没有提供关于不同武器如何发挥作用的细节。另一方面,我们也有专著详细介绍 AK-47 冲锋枪、虎式坦克等特定武器系统的特点。只有武器收藏家和军事迷才会对这些技术信息丰富的微观研究感兴趣。因此,有兴趣的知识型读者和历史学家只能在对武器系统的粗略论述和对具体武器的微观研究之间徘徊。莱特州立大学历史学教授保罗-洛克哈特(Paul Lockhart)的这部巨著填补了这一空白。他将重点转向了过去 600 年间火药战争时代的武器技术。他从大约 1400 年开始,到冷战结束为止。为了避免帕克和麦克尼尔(W. H. McNeill,代表作《追求力量》,1982 年出版)受到的大量批评,洛克哈特将目光局限于西欧和美国。他正确地指出,20 世纪 80 年代标志着火药武器主导地位的终结,而 20 世纪 90 年代则是信息革命的开端,信息革命的结果是信息系统的网络化占据主导地位,火力在战争中处于次要地位。[第 431 页尾)有关海、陆、空三大领域所使用的武器弹药的大量信息,简明扼要地向读者进行了分析。洛克哈特简明扼要地告诉我们重要武器的特点、工作原理以及被其他武器系统取代的原因。我们可以清楚地了解火柴枪,以及为什么它在 16 世纪会被火枪取代;后膛枪和枪口枪的区别;19 世纪末从黑火药到无烟火药的转变;20 世纪初从煤炭发动机到石油发动机的转变;栓动步枪和突击步枪的区别,等等。洛克哈特展示了武器系统的发展与战术变革之间的相互作用,功不可没。例如,火枪催生了线性战争,而步枪则促使小兵的出现。除了告诉我们不同的武器系统如何以及为何在特定时期占据主导地位,洛克哈特还提出了一个宏观论点。火力》一书令人信服地指出,拥有强大制造基础和大量标准质量武器的国家,在与部署数量有限的尖端武器的强国的战争中获胜。洛克哈特的分析比保罗-肯尼迪(Paul Kennedy)在《大国的兴衰》(The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,1987 年)一书中直截了当的论证更为细致,后者认为拥有最大经济基础的国家会取得胜利。理查德-奥弗里(Richard Overy)在《盟军为何获胜》(1995 年)一书中对第二次世界大战进行的案例研究表明,尽管纳粹部署了质量上乘的武器系统,但由于数量上的优势,他们还是被盟军打败了。洛克哈特将这一模式延伸到了过去 600 年的西方历史。有人可能会批评《火力》带有软技术决定论的味道。洛克哈特没有考虑到社会和文化风俗对火药武器升级及其部署的影响。但对于受过教育的非专业读者以及认真研究军事技术的学生来说,这本寓教于乐的珍贵书籍是必读之书。[卡乌什克-罗伊 卡乌什克-罗伊是贾达夫普尔大学历史系古鲁-纳纳克讲座教授...
Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare by Paul Lockhart (review)
Reviewed by:
Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare by Paul Lockhart
Kaushik Roy (bio)
Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare By Paul Lockhart. New York: Basic Books, 2021. Pp. xii + 624.
Gunpowder changed the course of warfare and, ipso facto, global history. The advocates of the Military Revolution thesis (starting from Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker's The Military Revolution, 1988) argue along this line. Even if one challenges this "big" assertion, there is no denying that gunpowder weaponries definitely constitute a break with the medieval past. There are some sophisticated global surveys about the history of the interrelationship between the changing contours of war and the evolution of military technology (for instance, Martin van Creveld's Technology and War, 1989; Trevor N. Dupuy's The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, 1990; and Jeremy Black's War and Technology, 2013, among others). However, such broad-range accounts provide few details about how the different weapons worked. On the other hand, we have monographs detailing the characteristics of particular weapon systems like AK-47s, Tiger tanks, etc. Such microstudies with a wealth of technical information interest only collectors of weapons and military buffs. Interested educated readers and historians are thus left hanging between broad-brush treatments of weapon systems at one pole and microstudies of specific weapons at the other.
In the voluminous work under review, Paul Lockhart, professor of history at Wright State University, fills this vacuum. He turns the focus on the technicalities of the weapons that made up the era of gunpowder warfare during the last 600 years. He begins in circa 1400 and ends with the end of the Cold War. To avoid the barrage of criticisms that Parker and W. H. McNeill (for his The Pursuit of Power, 1982) received, Lockhart limits his gaze to Western Europe and the United States. Rightly he says that the 1980s marked the end of the dominance of gunpowder weapons and the 1990s saw the beginning of the Information Revolution, which resulted in the primacy of networking of information systems, with firepower taking a secondary role in war. [End Page 431]
Lots of information regarding the arms and munitions used in the three domains (air, land, and sea) is pounded on the readers analytically and succinctly. Lockhart tells us concisely about the characteristics of the important weapons, how they worked, and why they were being replaced by other weapon systems. We get a clear idea of a matchlock and why it was replaced by a musket in the sixteenth century, the difference between breechloaders and muzzleloaders, the shift from black powder to smokeless powder toward the end of the nineteenth century, the transition from coal to oil engines at the beginning of the twentieth century, the distinction between a bolt-action rifle and an assault rifle, etc. Credit is due to Lockhart for showing the interaction between the development of weapon systems and the transformation of tactics. For instance, while the musket gave rise to linear warfare, rifles necessitated the advent of skirmishers.
Besides telling us how and why different weapon systems became dominant in particular time periods, Lockhart also puts forward a macroargument. Firepower persuasively argues that states with a greater manufacturing base and standard-quality weapons in large numbers won wars against powers that deployed cutting-edge weaponry in limited numbers. Lockhart's analysis is more nuanced than Paul Kennedy's straightforward argument in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987) that the country with the biggest economic base comes out victorious. Richard Overy's case study of World War II in Why the Allies Won (1995) showed that the Nazis—despite deploying qualitatively superior weapon systems—were defeated by the Allies due to their quantitative superiority. Lockhart extends this model throughout the last 600 years of Western history.
A critique might be that Firepower smacks of soft technological determinism. Lockhart does not consider social and cultural mores in shaping the upgradation of gunpowder weapons and their deployments. But this entertaining, valuable book is a must for educated lay readers, as well as for serious students of military technology. [End Page 432]
Kaushik Roy
Kaushik Roy is Guru Nanak Chair Professor in the Department of History at Jadavpur...
期刊介绍:
Technology and Culture, the preeminent journal of the history of technology, draws on scholarship in diverse disciplines to publish insightful pieces intended for general readers as well as specialists. Subscribers include scientists, engineers, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, museum curators, archivists, scholars, librarians, educators, historians, and many others. In addition to scholarly essays, each issue features 30-40 book reviews and reviews of new museum exhibitions. To illuminate important debates and draw attention to specific topics, the journal occasionally publishes thematic issues. Technology and Culture is the official journal of the Society for the History of Technology (SHOT).