代理咨询业:影响与被影响

IF 10.4 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Chong Shu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文开发了两种新方法,可从美国证券交易委员会的文件中推断出共同基金的代理顾问。然后,本文运用这些方法描述了 2007 年至 2021 年代理咨询行业的特征:(i) 截至 2021 年,ISS 和 Glass Lewis 共控制了约 90% 的市场份额。在此期间,ISS 的市场份额保持稳定,而 Glass Lewis 的市场份额有所上升。(ii) 当代理顾问发布反对管理层的建议时,与其他投资者相比,其客户也反对管理层的可能性要高出约 20 个百分点。(iii) 同时订阅两家代理顾问公司的基金,往往更倾向于按照其所使用的投票平台的顾问公司的建议进行投票。(iv) 当投资者不同意代理顾问之前的建议时,代理顾问往往会改变其建议立场。我提供的暗示性证据表明,这种调整既反映了向知情投资者学习,也反映了代理顾问希望与客户的偏好保持一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The proxy advisory industry: Influencing and being influenced

This paper develops two new methods to infer a mutual fund's proxy advisors from SEC filings. It then applies these methods to characterize features of the proxy advice industry from 2007 to 2021: (i) As of 2021, ISS and Glass Lewis collectively control approximately 90 percent of the market. During this period, the market share of ISS remains stable, while that of Glass Lewis has increased. (ii) When a proxy advisor issues a recommendation opposing management, its customers are approximately 20 percentage points more likely to also oppose management compared to other investors. (iii) Funds that subscribe to both proxy advisors tend to vote more similarly to the recommendations of the advisor whose voting platform they use. (iv) Proxy advisors often change their advisory stance when investors disagree with their previous advice. I offer suggestive evidence that this adaptation reflects both learning from informed investors and a desire by proxy advisors to align with the preferences of their customers.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
15.80
自引率
4.50%
发文量
192
审稿时长
37 days
期刊介绍: The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.
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