更强大的专利会带来更快的创新吗？集群检索的影响

IF 1.5 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

International Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-02-21 DOI:10.1111/iere.12688

Kaustav Das, Nicolas Klein

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们分析了两家公司在既定方法和创新方法之间的专利竞赛。唯一的马尔可夫完全均衡与卡特尔方案不谋而合，前提是且仅当企业具有利用良好创新方法的相同能力，或者不存在专利保护。否则，与卡特尔基准相比，均衡努力过多地集中在创新方法上。在内部专利强度下，实现突破的预期时间最小。因此，研发生产率的下降可能与研究工作集中于风险较高的领域和专利保护的加强同时发生。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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DO STRONGER PATENTS LEAD TO FASTER INNOVATION? THE EFFECT OF CLUSTERED SEARCH

We analyze a patent race between two firms choosing between an established and an innovative method. The unique Markov-perfect equilibrium coincides with the cartel solution if and only if firms have the same ability of leveraging a good innovative method or there is no patent protection. Otherwise, equilibrium efforts are clustered too much in the innovative method, as compared to the cartel benchmark. The expected time to a breakthrough is minimized at an interior patent strength. Thus, a decrease in R&D productivity can go hand-in-hand with a concentration of research efforts in riskier areas and stronger patent protections.

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来源期刊

International Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The International Economic Review was established in 1960 to provide a forum for modern quantitative economics. From its inception, the journal has tried to stimulate economic research around the world by publishing cutting edge papers in many areas of economics, including econometrics, economic theory, macro, and applied economics.