注意:请勿穿越!不要越过!经济衰退时监管资本缓冲与企业贷款的距离

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
CYRIL COUAILLIER, MARCO LO DUCA, ALESSIO REGHEZZA, COSTANZA RODRIGUEZ D'ACRI
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在危机期间,银行应在需要时提取监管缓冲资本,但我们发现,在大流行病期间,银行通过顺周期地减少企业贷款,与监管缓冲资本保持了安全距离。通过利用细粒度信贷登记数据,我们发现,在缓冲区之外资本余地很小的银行减少了信贷供应,而在危机中未提取信贷额度较大的银行的这种行为被放大了。尽管公共担保减轻了银行的顺周期行为及其在企业层面的实际影响,但受影响的企业无法完全重新平衡与其他银行的借贷需求。这些研究结果令人担忧,《巴塞尔协议三》引入的资本缓冲可能并不像预期的那样具有反周期作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Caution: Do Not Cross! Distance to Regulatory Capital Buffers and Corporate Lending in a Downturn
While banks are expected to draw down regulatory capital buffers in case of need during a crisis, we find that banks kept at a safe distance from regulatory buffers during the pandemic by procyclically reducing corporate lending. By exploiting granular credit register data, we show that banks with little capital headroom above their buffers reduced credit supply and that this behavior was amplified for banks that entered the crisis with larger undrawn credit lines. Affected firms were unable to fully rebalance their borrowing needs with other banks, although public guarantees mitigated banks' procyclical behavior and its real effect at the firm level. These findings raise concerns that the capital buffers introduced by Basel III may not be as countercyclical as intended.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
6.70%
发文量
98
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