萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》颁布后,首席执行官的研发投资风险是否增加了?

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
SeungWon Lee
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley Act,SOX)颁布前后各个时期研发投资变化与首席执行官更替之间的联系。研究认为,在《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》颁布后,研发支出的增长与销售额的增长不相匹配,可能会在风险感知增加的驱动下引发更频繁的首席执行官更替。1996 年至 2010 年的数据显示,在 SOX 法案之前,研发支出的增加与首席执行官的工作稳定性呈正相关。相比之下,在《萨氏法案》颁布后,研发支出的增加与首席执行官的更替率有关,尤其是非自愿解雇。研究进一步发现,在《公司法》实施后,当研发投资与销售增长相一致时,研发支出激增对首席执行官流失率的负面影响就会大大降低。研究结果表明,研发投资对首席执行官的更替有重大影响,这突出表明董事会有必要慎重考虑研发支出和首席执行官更替的后果,以便更好地协调股东和首席执行官的利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Has R&D investment become riskier for CEOs after the Sarbanes Oxley Act?

This study explores the link between R&D investment variability and CEO turnover across the eras surrounding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). It posits that, after SOX, R&D expenditure hikes not matched by sales growth may trigger more frequent CEO turnover, driven by a perceived increase in risk. Data from 1996 to 2010 reveal that, before SOX, R&D increases positively correlate with CEO job stability. In contrast, after SOX, a rise in R&D spending is linked to a higher rate of CEO turnover, particularly involuntary dismissals. The study further identifies that post-SOX, the negative impact of R&D spikes on CEO turnover is significantly mitigated when such investment aligns with sales growth. The findings suggest a significant influence of R&D investments on CEO turnover, underscoring the need for boards to deliberate the consequences of R&D spending and CEO turnover to better align shareholders and CEO interests.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
7.10%
发文量
69
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