权限控制困境与欧盟机构的制度设计

IF 2.6 3区 管理学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Berthold Rittberger, Eva Ruffing, Martin Weinrich, Arndt Wonka
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在过去的几十年里,欧洲联盟(欧盟)机构激增,以解决大量的治理问题。在设计欧盟机构时,欧盟立法者面临着一种矛盾:立法者希望机构能够胜任解决问题的工作,但同时也希望对机构加以控制。欧盟立法者如何平衡这两种需要?我们认为,机构的政治负责人并不一定要以能力换取控制,反之亦然,他们可以利用不同的制度策略--操纵机构的决策和决策者的独立性--来缓解能力与控制之间的困境。利用有关欧盟机构正式独立性的原始数据集,我们通过实证研究证明,委托人可以定制欧盟机构的独立性,以满足特定机构任务(监管、授权、执行和信息)带来的各自能力和控制要求。本文对有关欧盟机构化驱动因素的文献以及有关欧盟内外监管机构制度设计的讨论做出了重要贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

The competence-control dilemma and the institutional design of European Union agencies

The competence-control dilemma and the institutional design of European Union agencies

In the past decades, European Union (EU) agencies have proliferated to address a plethora of governance problems. When designing EU agencies, EU legislators confront a tension: Legislators want agencies to be competent problem-solvers, but they also want to keep agencies under control. How do EU legislators balance these two imperatives? We argue that agencies' political principals do not necessarily have to trade competence for control, and vice versa, but can draw on different institutional strategies – manipulating agencies' decision-making and decision-maker independence – to mitigate the competence-control dilemma. Drawing on an original dataset on EU agencies' formal independence, we demonstrate empirically that principals customize EU agencies' independence to match the respective competence and control demands that come with specific agency tasks: regulation, authorization, implementation and information. The paper makes an important contribution to the literature on the drivers of the EU's agencification and to debates on the institutional design of regulatory institutions in the EU and beyond.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.70
自引率
10.30%
发文量
91
期刊介绍: Governance provides a forum for the theoretical and practical discussion of executive politics, public policy, administration, and the organization of the state. Published in association with International Political Science Association''s Research Committee on the Structure & Organization of Government (SOG), it emphasizes peer-reviewed articles that take an international or comparative approach to public policy and administration. All papers, regardless of empirical focus, should have wider theoretical, comparative, or practical significance.
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