合谋的动机

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-14 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103798

Sangeun Ha , Fangyuan Ma , Alminas Žaldokas

{"title":"合谋的动机","authors":"Sangeun Ha , Fangyuan Ma , Alminas Žaldokas","doi":"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103798","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine how executive compensation can be designed to facilitate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the U.S. Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices. We argue this made collusion more appealing to shareholders, and find that these firms increased the sensitivity of executive pay to local rivals' performance, consistent with rewarding the managers for colluding with them. The affected CEOs were also granted longer vesting periods, which provides long-term incentives that could foster collusive arrangements.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51346,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Economics","volume":"154 ","pages":"Article 103798"},"PeriodicalIF":10.4000,"publicationDate":"2024-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Motivating collusion\",\"authors\":\"Sangeun Ha , Fangyuan Ma , Alminas Žaldokas\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103798\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We examine how executive compensation can be designed to facilitate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the U.S. Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices. We argue this made collusion more appealing to shareholders, and find that these firms increased the sensitivity of executive pay to local rivals' performance, consistent with rewarding the managers for colluding with them. The affected CEOs were also granted longer vesting periods, which provides long-term incentives that could foster collusive arrangements.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51346,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Financial Economics\",\"volume\":\"154 \",\"pages\":\"Article 103798\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":10.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-02-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Financial Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24000217\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X24000217","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了如何设计高管薪酬以促进产品市场合谋。我们研究了 2013 年关闭美国司法部几个地区办事处的决定，该决定降低了对这些关闭办事处附近企业的反垄断执法力度。我们认为这使得合谋对股东更有吸引力，并发现这些公司提高了高管薪酬对当地竞争对手业绩的敏感度，这与奖励与竞争对手合谋的经理人是一致的。受影响的首席执行官还获得了更长的归属期，这提供了可能助长合谋安排的长期激励。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Motivating collusion

We examine how executive compensation can be designed to facilitate product market collusion. We look at the 2013 decision to close several regional offices of the U.S. Department of Justice, which lowered antitrust enforcement for firms located near these closed offices. We argue this made collusion more appealing to shareholders, and find that these firms increased the sensitivity of executive pay to local rivals' performance, consistent with rewarding the managers for colluding with them. The affected CEOs were also granted longer vesting periods, which provides long-term incentives that could foster collusive arrangements.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.