操纵贸易条件的经济制裁理论

IF 3.8 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Journal of International Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-09 DOI:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103898

John Sturm Becko

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引用次数: 0

摘要

一个国家如何设计经济制裁，才能使被制裁国的经济成本最大化，而制裁国的成本最小化？我从国际贸易的角度来考虑这个问题，并将作为经济制裁的贸易限制与作为贸易条件操纵的贸易限制紧密联系起来。这种联系对于设计作为制裁的贸易税具有有益的启示：小规模制裁会增加制裁国的福利。制裁与贸易条件操纵针对的是相同的商品。制裁忽视了制裁国的供需弹性。

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A theory of economic sanctions as terms-of-trade manipulation

How can a country design economic sanctions to maximize their economic cost to the sanctioned country at the lowest cost to the sanctioner? I consider this problem from the perspective of international trade and draw a close connection between trade restrictions as economic sanctions and trade restrictions as terms-of-trade manipulation. This connection has useful implications for the design of trade taxes as sanctions: Small sanctions increase welfare in the sanctioning country. Sanctions target the same goods as terms-of-trade manipulation. Sanctions ignore elasticities of demand and supply in the sanctioning country.

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来源期刊

Journal of International Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

5.80

自引率

6.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of International Economics is intended to serve as the primary outlet for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of international economics. These include, but are not limited to the following: trade patterns, commercial policy; international institutions; exchange rates; open economy macroeconomics; international finance; international factor mobility. The Journal especially encourages the submission of articles which are empirical in nature, or deal with issues of open economy macroeconomics and international finance. Theoretical work submitted to the Journal should be original in its motivation or modelling structure. Empirical analysis should be based on a theoretical framework, and should be capable of replication.