竞争如何影响零售银行业务？银行合并的准实验证据

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-02-07 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103797

Jack Liebersohn

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究的银行反垄断规则会不连续地改变银行兼并对竞争的影响。在市场集中度超过临界值的情况下，合并被强制剥离的可能性会急剧上升，从而导致这些市场中银行数量的增加。与竞争加剧相一致的是，干预导致存款利率上升。由于再融资和购买，抵押贷款的发放增加了 11%。然而，小企业贷款数量没有变化。干预的效果不会随着时间的推移而消失，非银行贷款人的反应与银行类似。总体而言，反托拉斯规则可以增加银行竞争，但各种关系保护银行免受竞争对手的影响。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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How does competition affect retail banking? Quasi-experimental evidence from bank mergers

This paper studies bank antitrust rules which discontinuously shift bank mergers' competitive impact. The likelihood of mandatory divestiture rises sharply for mergers in markets above a threshold level of concentration, leading to an increase in the number of banks in these markets. Consistent with greater competition, intervention leads to higher deposit rates. Mortgage originations rise by 11%, from both refinancing and purchases. However, small business loan quantities do not change. The effects of intervention do not dissipate over time, and nonbank lenders respond similarly to banks. Overall, antitrust rules can increase bank competition, but relationships protect banks from competitors.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.