产出补贴政策下综合公用事业公司的内生竞争

IF 3.8 3区经济学 Q3 ENERGY & FUELS

Utilities Policy Pub Date : 2024-02-08 DOI:10.1016/j.jup.2024.101720

Lili Xu , Sang-Ho Lee

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本研究中，我们考虑了一个混合下游市场，即一家纵向一体化的公用事业公司与一家私营公司竞争，后者在产出补贴下从上游公司购买投入品。我们构建了一个内生竞争模式博弈，发现不仅纯粹的库诺竞争和贝特朗竞争会出现均衡，而且贝特朗-库诺混合竞争也会根据补贴率的不同而出现。然而，无论补贴率如何，库诺竞争在私人市场中都是唯一的均衡。我们证明，在私有化的同时进行补贴，使企业协调从伯特兰-库诺混合竞争转向库诺竞争，可以提高福利。

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Endogenous competition with an integrated public utility firm under an output subsidy policy

In this study, we consider a mixed downstream market wherein a vertically integrated public utility firm competes with a private firm that purchases inputs from an upstream firm under output subsidies. We construct an endogenous competition mode game and find that not only do pure Cournot and Bertrand competitions appear as equilibria, but a hybrid Bertrand-Cournot competition can also materialize depending on the subsidy rate. However, Cournot competition appears as a unique equilibrium in the private market irrespective of subsidy rate. We demonstrate that privatization, accompanied by subsidization that shifts firms’ coordination from a hybrid Bertrand-Cournot competition to a Cournot competition, could improve welfare.

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来源期刊

Utilities Policy ENERGY & FUELS-ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

CiteScore

6.80

自引率

10.00%

发文量

审稿时长

66 days

期刊介绍： Utilities Policy is deliberately international, interdisciplinary, and intersectoral. Articles address utility trends and issues in both developed and developing economies. Authors and reviewers come from various disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology, law, finance, accounting, management, and engineering. Areas of focus include the utility and network industries providing essential electricity, natural gas, water and wastewater, solid waste, communications, broadband, postal, and public transportation services. Utilities Policy invites submissions that apply various quantitative and qualitative methods. Contributions are welcome from both established and emerging scholars as well as accomplished practitioners. Interdisciplinary, comparative, and applied works are encouraged. Submissions to the journal should have a clear focus on governance, performance, and/or analysis of public utilities with an aim toward informing the policymaking process and providing recommendations as appropriate. Relevant topics and issues include but are not limited to industry structures and ownership, market design and dynamics, economic development, resource planning, system modeling, accounting and finance, infrastructure investment, supply and demand efficiency, strategic management and productivity, network operations and integration, supply chains, adaptation and flexibility, service-quality standards, benchmarking and metrics, benefit-cost analysis, behavior and incentives, pricing and demand response, economic and environmental regulation, regulatory performance and impact, restructuring and deregulation, and policy institutions.