死亡是价值源泉的消亡:死亡是道德地位不可逆转的丧失的建构主义理论。

Theoretical medicine and bioethics Pub Date : 2024-04-01 Epub Date: 2024-02-08 DOI:10.1007/s11017-023-09656-w
Piotr Grzegorz Nowak
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引用次数: 0

摘要

2017年,迈克尔-奈尔-柯林斯提出了 "转义论证"(Transitivity Argument),声称根据以丧失道德地位来定义死亡的概念,脑死亡患者是活着的。本文分三步对奈尔-柯林斯的观点提出质疑。首先,我阐述了道德地位的概念,声称要正确理解这一概念,就必须掌握直接义务和间接义务之间的区别。其次,我论证了他对 "易变性论证 "中隐含的道德地位的理解是错误的,因为它不是建立在直接义务和间接义务的区别之上的。第三,我将说明奈尔-科林斯论证中的这一缺陷是如何基于偏好功利主义与欲望满足理论之间更普遍的问题的。最后,我提出了道德地位的建构主义理论和与之相关的死亡道德概念,并解释了这一概念是如何挑战 "传递性论证 "的。根据我的观点,脑死亡构成了有效的死亡标准,因为脑死亡与保留情感态度和珍视任何事物的能力是不相容的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Death as the extinction of the source of value: the constructivist theory of death as an irreversible loss of moral status.

In 2017, Michael Nair-Collins formulated his Transitivity Argument which claimed that brain-dead patients are alive according to a concept that defines death in terms of the loss of moral status. This article challenges Nair-Collins' view in three steps. First, I elaborate on the concept of moral status, claiming that to understand this notion appropriately, one must grasp the distinction between direct and indirect duties. Second, I argue that his understanding of moral status implicit in the Transitivity Argument is faulty since it is not based on a distinction between direct and indirect duties. Third, I show how this flaw in Nair-Collins' argument is grounded in the more general problems between preference utilitarianism and desire fulfillment theory. Finally, I present the constructivist theory of moral status and the associated moral concept of death and explain how this concept challenges the Transitivity Argument. According to my view, brain death constitutes a valid criterion of death since brain death is incompatible with the preserved capacity to have affective attitudes and to value anything.

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