快餐店中的特许经营权类型和非经济绩效:家庭经营的特许经营店违反卫生法规的情况是否较少?

IF 6.5 1区 经济学 Q1 BUSINESS
Erik Markin, Chelsea Sherlock, R. Gabrielle Swab, Benjamin D. McLarty
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们从代理理论的角度出发,结合社会情感财富(SEW)重要性的相关论点,评估了家族、独资和公司所有及经营的餐厅在特许经营背景下对相关非经济目标(即违反卫生法规)的影响。由于代理问题和以家族为中心的长期动机(例如,使家族成员致富并保持家族所有权世代相传的愿望),我们预测家族特许经营将更加重视非经济结果,并应优于独资和公司经营的餐馆(即,收到较少的违反卫生法规的情况)。与此相关的是,我们还预测单人创办的特许经营店由于对特许经营店的认同感增强,其受到的违规处罚会少于公司连锁店。我们以美国东南部的三家大型快餐连锁店为样本,对我们的假设进行了检验。令人惊讶的是,我们的研究结果表明,家族所有的餐馆在非经济结果上的表现比独立创始人和公司所有的餐馆都要差。我们讨论了这些发现的意义,为家族企业研究和特许经营从业者提供参考。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Franchise ownership types and noneconomic performance among quick service restaurants: do family operated franchises receive fewer health code violations?

Using an agency theory perspective combined with arguments related to the importance of socioemotional wealth (SEW), we evaluate the distinctions among family-, lone-founder-, and corporate-owned and operated restaurants regarding their impact on relevant noneconomic goals in the franchising context (i.e., health code violations). Because of agency issues and family-centric long-term motivations (e.g., desires to enrich members of the family and maintain family ownership across generations), we predict family franchises will place a greater emphasis on noneconomic outcomes and should outperform both lone-founder and corporate restaurants (i.e., receive less health-code violations). Relatedly, we also predict lone-founder franchises will receive fewer violations than corporate outlets due to their enhanced identification with the franchise. We test our hypotheses with a sample of three large fast-food chains in the Southeastern United States. Surprisingly, our results indicate that family-owned restaurants perform worse on noneconomic outcomes than both lone-founder- and corporate-owned restaurants. We discuss the implications of these findings to offer contributions to family business research and franchise practitioners alike.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.10
自引率
9.40%
发文量
124
期刊介绍: Small Business Economics: An Entrepreneurship Journal (SBEJ) publishes original, rigorous theoretical and empirical research addressing all aspects of entrepreneurship and small business economics, with a special emphasis on the economic and societal relevance of research findings for scholars, practitioners and policy makers. SBEJ covers a broad scope of topics, ranging from the core themes of the entrepreneurial process and new venture creation to other topics like self-employment, family firms, small and medium-sized enterprises, innovative start-ups, and entrepreneurial finance. SBEJ welcomes scientific studies at different levels of analysis, including individuals (e.g. entrepreneurs'' characteristics and occupational choice), firms (e.g., firms’ life courses and performance, innovation, and global issues like digitization), macro level (e.g., institutions and public policies within local, regional, national and international contexts), as well as cross-level dynamics. As a leading entrepreneurship journal, SBEJ welcomes cross-disciplinary research. Officially cited as: Small Bus Econ
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