设计残疾保险改革：收紧资格规则还是减少福利？

IF 6.6 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Econometrica Pub Date : 2024-01-30 DOI:10.3982/ECTA19021

Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller

{"title":"设计残疾保险改革：收紧资格规则还是减少福利？","authors":"Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller","doi":"10.3982/ECTA19021","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n <p>This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":50556,"journal":{"name":"Econometrica","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":6.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19021","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?\",\"authors\":\"Andreas Haller, Stefan Staubli, Josef Zweimüller\",\"doi\":\"10.3982/ECTA19021\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div>\\n <p>This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.</p>\\n </div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":50556,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Econometrica\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":6.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.3982/ECTA19021\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Econometrica\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA19021\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometrica","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA19021","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文建立了一个充分统计框架，用于分析伤残保险（DI）的福利效应。我们推导了两个主要的 DI 政策参数的社会最优条件：（i）资格规则和（ii）福利水平。将这一框架应用于奥地利的两项限制性 DI 改革，我们发现，更严格的 DI 资格规则会带来更高的财政成本节约和更低的保险损失。因此，在缩减奥地利的直接养老金制度时，更严格的直接养老金资格规则主导了直接养老金福利的减少。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?

查看原文本刊更多论文

Designing Disability Insurance Reforms: Tightening Eligibility Rules or Reducing Benefits?

This paper develops a sufficient statistics framework for analyzing the welfare effects of disability insurance (DI). We derive social-optimality conditions for the two main DI policy parameters: (i) eligibility rules and (ii) benefit levels. Applying this framework to two restrictive DI reforms in Austria, we find that tighter DI eligibility rules triggered higher fiscal cost savings and lower insurance losses. Hence, tighter DI eligibility rules dominate DI benefit reductions in scaling back the Austrian DI system.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Econometrica 社会科学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

11.00

自引率

3.30%

发文量

审稿时长

6-12 weeks

期刊介绍： Econometrica publishes original articles in all branches of economics - theoretical and empirical, abstract and applied, providing wide-ranging coverage across the subject area. It promotes studies that aim at the unification of the theoretical-quantitative and the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems and that are penetrated by constructive and rigorous thinking. It explores a unique range of topics each year - from the frontier of theoretical developments in many new and important areas, to research on current and applied economic problems, to methodologically innovative, theoretical and applied studies in econometrics. Econometrica maintains a long tradition that submitted articles are refereed carefully and that detailed and thoughtful referee reports are provided to the author as an aid to scientific research, thus ensuring the high calibre of papers found in Econometrica. An international board of editors, together with the referees it has selected, has succeeded in substantially reducing editorial turnaround time, thereby encouraging submissions of the highest quality. We strongly encourage recent Ph. D. graduates to submit their work to Econometrica. Our policy is to take into account the fact that recent graduates are less experienced in the process of writing and submitting papers.