{"title":"管理者近视与企业社会责任:来自中国盈利沟通会文本分析的证据","authors":"Hui Ding, Fuwei Jiang, Shan Zhang, Zhining Zhang","doi":"10.1016/j.jbef.2024.100886","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Corporate social responsibility (CSR) plays an important role in developing countries achieving sustainable goals. Using the textual analysis of Chinese earnings communication conferences, we investigate whether the managers' time horizons influence CSR performance. We find that the level of managerial myopia is negatively related to CSR scores. This deleterious impact manifests asymmetrically under diverse expectations. Furthermore, guided by the CSR pyramid theory, our findings suggest that managerial myopia undermines both financial and legal responsibilities, subsequently exerting an influence on the commitment to social responsibility. Compensation incentives can effectively mitigate the deleterious impacts associated with myopia. Nevertheless, heightened external pressures originating from capital and product markets may impose constraints on managers' time horizons, thereby amplifying the adverse repercussions of myopia.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47026,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance","volume":"41 ","pages":"Article 100886"},"PeriodicalIF":4.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Managerial myopia and corporate social responsibility:Evidence from the textual analysis of chinese earnings communication conferences\",\"authors\":\"Hui Ding, Fuwei Jiang, Shan Zhang, Zhining Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jbef.2024.100886\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>Corporate social responsibility (CSR) plays an important role in developing countries achieving sustainable goals. Using the textual analysis of Chinese earnings communication conferences, we investigate whether the managers' time horizons influence CSR performance. We find that the level of managerial myopia is negatively related to CSR scores. This deleterious impact manifests asymmetrically under diverse expectations. Furthermore, guided by the CSR pyramid theory, our findings suggest that managerial myopia undermines both financial and legal responsibilities, subsequently exerting an influence on the commitment to social responsibility. Compensation incentives can effectively mitigate the deleterious impacts associated with myopia. Nevertheless, heightened external pressures originating from capital and product markets may impose constraints on managers' time horizons, thereby amplifying the adverse repercussions of myopia.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47026,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance\",\"volume\":\"41 \",\"pages\":\"Article 100886\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214635024000017\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214635024000017","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Managerial myopia and corporate social responsibility:Evidence from the textual analysis of chinese earnings communication conferences
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) plays an important role in developing countries achieving sustainable goals. Using the textual analysis of Chinese earnings communication conferences, we investigate whether the managers' time horizons influence CSR performance. We find that the level of managerial myopia is negatively related to CSR scores. This deleterious impact manifests asymmetrically under diverse expectations. Furthermore, guided by the CSR pyramid theory, our findings suggest that managerial myopia undermines both financial and legal responsibilities, subsequently exerting an influence on the commitment to social responsibility. Compensation incentives can effectively mitigate the deleterious impacts associated with myopia. Nevertheless, heightened external pressures originating from capital and product markets may impose constraints on managers' time horizons, thereby amplifying the adverse repercussions of myopia.
期刊介绍:
Behavioral and Experimental Finance represent lenses and approaches through which we can view financial decision-making. The aim of the journal is to publish high quality research in all fields of finance, where such research is carried out with a behavioral perspective and / or is carried out via experimental methods. It is open to but not limited to papers which cover investigations of biases, the role of various neurological markers in financial decision making, national and organizational culture as it impacts financial decision making, sentiment and asset pricing, the design and implementation of experiments to investigate financial decision making and trading, methodological experiments, and natural experiments.
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance welcomes full-length and short letter papers in the area of behavioral finance and experimental finance. The focus is on rapid dissemination of high-impact research in these areas.