Weiyan Gao, Yuzhang Wang, Fengrong Wang, William Mbanyele
{"title":"环境法院能否打破环境治理中的合谋?中国企业绿色创新的证据","authors":"Weiyan Gao, Yuzhang Wang, Fengrong Wang, William Mbanyele","doi":"10.1016/j.qref.2024.01.005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The environmental courts represent institutional innovation in the judicial system independent of administrative regulations, this study examines whether and how environmental courts promote corporate green innovation by breaking collusion in Chinese heavily polluting listed firms from 2003 to 2020. Based on a staggered difference-in-difference analysis, our findings show that environmental courts have a stronger stimulating effect on green innovation quality and no effect on low-quality green patents. This effect is particularly more pronounced for firms with lower risk-taking ability, higher green agency costs, and state-owned firms. We also confirmed that environmental courts enhance authoritative judicial constraints on local governments, thereby curbing collusion and forcing them to implement environmental protection subsidies and administrative penalties to optimize corporate green innovation structure. Our fine-grained analysis indicates that independent green patents are more sensitive to environmental courts than collaborative ones. However, corporate green R&D efficiency does not improve following the establishment of environmental courts. Overall, our study underscores the importance of strengthening environmental justice as an effective mechanism for facilitating a just transition to a low-carbon green economy.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47962,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance","volume":"94 ","pages":"Pages 133-149"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do environmental courts break collusion in environmental governance? Evidence from corporate green innovation in China\",\"authors\":\"Weiyan Gao, Yuzhang Wang, Fengrong Wang, William Mbanyele\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.qref.2024.01.005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The environmental courts represent institutional innovation in the judicial system independent of administrative regulations, this study examines whether and how environmental courts promote corporate green innovation by breaking collusion in Chinese heavily polluting listed firms from 2003 to 2020. Based on a staggered difference-in-difference analysis, our findings show that environmental courts have a stronger stimulating effect on green innovation quality and no effect on low-quality green patents. This effect is particularly more pronounced for firms with lower risk-taking ability, higher green agency costs, and state-owned firms. We also confirmed that environmental courts enhance authoritative judicial constraints on local governments, thereby curbing collusion and forcing them to implement environmental protection subsidies and administrative penalties to optimize corporate green innovation structure. Our fine-grained analysis indicates that independent green patents are more sensitive to environmental courts than collaborative ones. However, corporate green R&D efficiency does not improve following the establishment of environmental courts. Overall, our study underscores the importance of strengthening environmental justice as an effective mechanism for facilitating a just transition to a low-carbon green economy.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47962,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance\",\"volume\":\"94 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 133-149\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976924000127\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976924000127","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do environmental courts break collusion in environmental governance? Evidence from corporate green innovation in China
The environmental courts represent institutional innovation in the judicial system independent of administrative regulations, this study examines whether and how environmental courts promote corporate green innovation by breaking collusion in Chinese heavily polluting listed firms from 2003 to 2020. Based on a staggered difference-in-difference analysis, our findings show that environmental courts have a stronger stimulating effect on green innovation quality and no effect on low-quality green patents. This effect is particularly more pronounced for firms with lower risk-taking ability, higher green agency costs, and state-owned firms. We also confirmed that environmental courts enhance authoritative judicial constraints on local governments, thereby curbing collusion and forcing them to implement environmental protection subsidies and administrative penalties to optimize corporate green innovation structure. Our fine-grained analysis indicates that independent green patents are more sensitive to environmental courts than collaborative ones. However, corporate green R&D efficiency does not improve following the establishment of environmental courts. Overall, our study underscores the importance of strengthening environmental justice as an effective mechanism for facilitating a just transition to a low-carbon green economy.
期刊介绍:
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (QREF) attracts and publishes high quality manuscripts that cover topics in the areas of economics, financial economics and finance. The subject matter may be theoretical, empirical or policy related. Emphasis is placed on quality, originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis and clear writing. At least one Special Issue is published per year. These issues have guest editors, are devoted to a single theme and the papers have well known authors. In addition we pride ourselves in being able to provide three to four article "Focus" sections in most of our issues.