{"title":"农业保护计划中的合同违约行为:来自美国路易斯安那州的小组证据","authors":"S. Pathak, Hua Wang, Naveen C. Adusumilli","doi":"10.1017/age.2023.39","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Cost-share contracts, offered through working lands programs, are instrumental in addressing environmental externalities from agriculture and generating ecosystem services. However, the persistent trend of noncompliance with cost-share contractual terms has become a problem for funding agencies and policymakers. This paper aims to study noncompliance issues within the US working lands programs using historical county-level panel data (1997–2019) from Louisiana. The results show that noncompliance is attributed more to cancellations than terminations due to flexible provisions within the cancellation option. The significant incentive effect of payment obligations reveals that revisiting payment rates could reduce contract noncompliance and mitigate moral hazard.","PeriodicalId":44443,"journal":{"name":"Agricultural and Resource Economics Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Contract noncompliance in agricultural conservation programs: Panel evidence from Louisiana, USA\",\"authors\":\"S. Pathak, Hua Wang, Naveen C. Adusumilli\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/age.2023.39\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Cost-share contracts, offered through working lands programs, are instrumental in addressing environmental externalities from agriculture and generating ecosystem services. However, the persistent trend of noncompliance with cost-share contractual terms has become a problem for funding agencies and policymakers. This paper aims to study noncompliance issues within the US working lands programs using historical county-level panel data (1997–2019) from Louisiana. The results show that noncompliance is attributed more to cancellations than terminations due to flexible provisions within the cancellation option. The significant incentive effect of payment obligations reveals that revisiting payment rates could reduce contract noncompliance and mitigate moral hazard.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44443,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Agricultural and Resource Economics Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Agricultural and Resource Economics Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/age.2023.39\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Agricultural and Resource Economics Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/age.2023.39","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Contract noncompliance in agricultural conservation programs: Panel evidence from Louisiana, USA
Cost-share contracts, offered through working lands programs, are instrumental in addressing environmental externalities from agriculture and generating ecosystem services. However, the persistent trend of noncompliance with cost-share contractual terms has become a problem for funding agencies and policymakers. This paper aims to study noncompliance issues within the US working lands programs using historical county-level panel data (1997–2019) from Louisiana. The results show that noncompliance is attributed more to cancellations than terminations due to flexible provisions within the cancellation option. The significant incentive effect of payment obligations reveals that revisiting payment rates could reduce contract noncompliance and mitigate moral hazard.
期刊介绍:
The purpose of the Review is to foster and disseminate professional thought and literature relating to the economics of agriculture, natural resources, and community development. It is published twice a year in April and October. In addition to normal refereed articles, it also publishes invited papers presented at the annual meetings of the NAREA as well as abstracts of selected papers presented at those meetings. The Review was formerly known as the Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics