贷方规避风险的国家或有债务

IF 2.9 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Gonçalo Pina
{"title":"贷方规避风险的国家或有债务","authors":"Gonçalo Pina","doi":"10.1016/j.qref.2024.01.009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>State-contingent debt has the potential to eliminate costly debt crises. Yet, markets for this type of debt remain essentially closed. This paper uses a simple model to show conditions under which specialized risk-averse foreign lenders prefer non-contingent debt to state-contingent debt. Borrowers always prefer state-contingent debt as non-contingent debt increases the probability of default and reduces investment and output. However, lenders face a trade-off between the total surplus generated by the investment project and the share that they appropriate through the financial trade. Even though total surplus is smaller with non-contingent debt when compared to state-contingent debt, the share of the surplus that goes to lenders is larger under non-contingent debt. The paper then characterizes environments where state-contingent debt is more likely to be preferred by both borrowers and lenders under risk aversion.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47962,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance","volume":"94 ","pages":"Pages 180-189"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"State-contingent debt with lender risk aversion\",\"authors\":\"Gonçalo Pina\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.qref.2024.01.009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>State-contingent debt has the potential to eliminate costly debt crises. Yet, markets for this type of debt remain essentially closed. This paper uses a simple model to show conditions under which specialized risk-averse foreign lenders prefer non-contingent debt to state-contingent debt. Borrowers always prefer state-contingent debt as non-contingent debt increases the probability of default and reduces investment and output. However, lenders face a trade-off between the total surplus generated by the investment project and the share that they appropriate through the financial trade. Even though total surplus is smaller with non-contingent debt when compared to state-contingent debt, the share of the surplus that goes to lenders is larger under non-contingent debt. The paper then characterizes environments where state-contingent debt is more likely to be preferred by both borrowers and lenders under risk aversion.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47962,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance\",\"volume\":\"94 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 180-189\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976924000152\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976924000152","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

国家债务有可能消除代价高昂的债务危机。然而,这类债务的市场基本上仍然是封闭的。本文使用一个简单的模型来说明在哪些条件下,专门规避风险的外国贷款人更倾向于选择非有条件债务,而不是国有条件债务。借款人总是倾向于选择有条件债务,因为无条件债务会增加违约概率,减少投资和产出。然而,贷款人需要在投资项目产生的总盈余与他们通过金融交易获得的份额之间做出权衡。尽管与有条件债务相比,无条件债务的总盈余较少,但在无条件债务下,贷方获得的盈余份额较大。然后,本文描述了在规避风险的情况下借贷双方更倾向于选择有条件债务的环境特征。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
State-contingent debt with lender risk aversion

State-contingent debt has the potential to eliminate costly debt crises. Yet, markets for this type of debt remain essentially closed. This paper uses a simple model to show conditions under which specialized risk-averse foreign lenders prefer non-contingent debt to state-contingent debt. Borrowers always prefer state-contingent debt as non-contingent debt increases the probability of default and reduces investment and output. However, lenders face a trade-off between the total surplus generated by the investment project and the share that they appropriate through the financial trade. Even though total surplus is smaller with non-contingent debt when compared to state-contingent debt, the share of the surplus that goes to lenders is larger under non-contingent debt. The paper then characterizes environments where state-contingent debt is more likely to be preferred by both borrowers and lenders under risk aversion.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
6.00
自引率
2.90%
发文量
118
期刊介绍: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (QREF) attracts and publishes high quality manuscripts that cover topics in the areas of economics, financial economics and finance. The subject matter may be theoretical, empirical or policy related. Emphasis is placed on quality, originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis and clear writing. At least one Special Issue is published per year. These issues have guest editors, are devoted to a single theme and the papers have well known authors. In addition we pride ourselves in being able to provide three to four article "Focus" sections in most of our issues.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信