{"title":"意识的全局理论与局部理论以及脑器官组织中的意识评估问题","authors":"Maxence Gaillard","doi":"10.1007/s12152-024-09544-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Any attempt at consciousness assessment in organoids requires careful consideration of the theory of consciousness that researchers will rely on when performing this task. In cognitive neuroscience and the clinic, there are tools and theories used to detect and measure consciousness, typically in human beings, but none of them is neither fully consensual nor fit for the biological characteristics of organoids. I discuss the existing attempt relying on the Integrated Information Theory and its models and tools. Then, I revive the distinction between global theories of consciousness and local theories of consciousness as a thought-provoking one for those engaged in the difficult task of adapting models of consciousness to the biological reality of brain organoids. The “microconsciousness theory” of Semir Zeki is taken as an exploratory path and illustration of a theory defending that minimal networks can support a form of consciousness. I suggest that the skepticism prevailing in the neuroscience community regarding the possibility of organoid consciousness relies on some assumptions related to a globalist account of consciousness and that other accounts are worth exploring at this stage.</p>","PeriodicalId":49255,"journal":{"name":"Neuroethics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Global Versus Local Theories of Consciousness and the Consciousness Assessment Issue in Brain Organoids\",\"authors\":\"Maxence Gaillard\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s12152-024-09544-7\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Any attempt at consciousness assessment in organoids requires careful consideration of the theory of consciousness that researchers will rely on when performing this task. In cognitive neuroscience and the clinic, there are tools and theories used to detect and measure consciousness, typically in human beings, but none of them is neither fully consensual nor fit for the biological characteristics of organoids. I discuss the existing attempt relying on the Integrated Information Theory and its models and tools. Then, I revive the distinction between global theories of consciousness and local theories of consciousness as a thought-provoking one for those engaged in the difficult task of adapting models of consciousness to the biological reality of brain organoids. The “microconsciousness theory” of Semir Zeki is taken as an exploratory path and illustration of a theory defending that minimal networks can support a form of consciousness. I suggest that the skepticism prevailing in the neuroscience community regarding the possibility of organoid consciousness relies on some assumptions related to a globalist account of consciousness and that other accounts are worth exploring at this stage.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":49255,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Neuroethics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Neuroethics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"98\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09544-7\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ETHICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Neuroethics","FirstCategoryId":"98","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09544-7","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ETHICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Global Versus Local Theories of Consciousness and the Consciousness Assessment Issue in Brain Organoids
Any attempt at consciousness assessment in organoids requires careful consideration of the theory of consciousness that researchers will rely on when performing this task. In cognitive neuroscience and the clinic, there are tools and theories used to detect and measure consciousness, typically in human beings, but none of them is neither fully consensual nor fit for the biological characteristics of organoids. I discuss the existing attempt relying on the Integrated Information Theory and its models and tools. Then, I revive the distinction between global theories of consciousness and local theories of consciousness as a thought-provoking one for those engaged in the difficult task of adapting models of consciousness to the biological reality of brain organoids. The “microconsciousness theory” of Semir Zeki is taken as an exploratory path and illustration of a theory defending that minimal networks can support a form of consciousness. I suggest that the skepticism prevailing in the neuroscience community regarding the possibility of organoid consciousness relies on some assumptions related to a globalist account of consciousness and that other accounts are worth exploring at this stage.
期刊介绍:
Neuroethics is an international, peer-reviewed journal dedicated to academic articles on the ethical, legal, political, social and philosophical questions provoked by research in the contemporary sciences of the mind and brain; especially, but not only, neuroscience, psychiatry and psychology. The journal publishes articles on questions raised by the sciences of the brain and mind, and on the ways in which the sciences of the brain and mind illuminate longstanding debates in ethics and philosophy.