长青

IF 10.4 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Financial Economics Pub Date : 2024-01-25 DOI:10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103778

Miguel Faria-e-Castro , Pascal Paul , Juan M. Sánchez

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们建立了一个简单的集中贷款模型，在该模型中，贷款人有动机通过向濒临违约的企业提供更好的贷款条件来实现贷款的常青化。我们利用美国的贷款监管数据来检测这种贷款行为。拥有企业较大债务份额的银行会以较低的利率为陷入困境的企业提供相对较多的信贷。在这一经验验证的基础上，我们将理论机制纳入一个动态的异质企业模型，以证明常青化会影响总体结果，导致利率降低、债务水平上升和生产率下降。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Evergreening

We develop a simple model of concentrated lending where lenders have incentives for evergreening loans by offering better terms to firms that are close to default. We detect such lending behavior using loan-level supervisory data for the United States. Banks that own a larger share of a firm's debt provide distressed firms with relatively more credit at lower interest rates. Building on this empirical validation, we incorporate the theoretical mechanism into a dynamic heterogeneous-firm model to show that evergreening affects aggregate outcomes, resulting in lower interest rates, higher levels of debt, and lower productivity.

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来源期刊

Journal of Financial Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

15.80

自引率

4.50%

发文量

192

审稿时长

37 days

期刊介绍： The Journal of Financial Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of research in the area of financial economics and the theory of the firm, placing primary emphasis on the highest quality analytical, empirical, and clinical contributions in the following major areas: capital markets, financial institutions, corporate finance, corporate governance, and the economics of organizations.