{"title":"如何阅读《如何用文字做事》:论斯比萨的矛盾证明","authors":"Jeremy Wanderer, Leo Townsend","doi":"10.1007/s11406-024-00714-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Midway through <i>How to Do Things With Words</i>, J.L. Austin’s announces a “fresh start” in his efforts to characterize the ways in which speech is action, and introduces a new conceptual framework from the one he has been using up to that point. Against a common reading that portrays this move as simply abandoning the framework so far developed, Marina Sbisà contends that the text takes the argumentative form of a proof by contradiction, such that the initial framework plays an instrumental role as part of a proof in favour of the subsequent one. Despite agreeing with Sbisà’s broad instrumentalist approach, we argue that her regimentation of Austin’s narrative into a proof by contradiction ultimately fails - both as a proof and as an interpretation of Austin. Instead, we suggest that a better way of interpreting the peculiar structure of <i>How to Do Things With Words</i> is as a pedagogical exercise whose point is to bring a concealed alternative into view in a manner that also explains its initial concealment, and that this approach provides richer resources for supporting Sbisà’s own conventionalist understanding of illocution than that afforded by reading the text as a proof by contradiction.</p>","PeriodicalId":46695,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHIA","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"How to Read How to Do Things with Words: On Sbisà’s Proof by Contradiction\",\"authors\":\"Jeremy Wanderer, Leo Townsend\",\"doi\":\"10.1007/s11406-024-00714-8\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Midway through <i>How to Do Things With Words</i>, J.L. Austin’s announces a “fresh start” in his efforts to characterize the ways in which speech is action, and introduces a new conceptual framework from the one he has been using up to that point. Against a common reading that portrays this move as simply abandoning the framework so far developed, Marina Sbisà contends that the text takes the argumentative form of a proof by contradiction, such that the initial framework plays an instrumental role as part of a proof in favour of the subsequent one. Despite agreeing with Sbisà’s broad instrumentalist approach, we argue that her regimentation of Austin’s narrative into a proof by contradiction ultimately fails - both as a proof and as an interpretation of Austin. Instead, we suggest that a better way of interpreting the peculiar structure of <i>How to Do Things With Words</i> is as a pedagogical exercise whose point is to bring a concealed alternative into view in a manner that also explains its initial concealment, and that this approach provides richer resources for supporting Sbisà’s own conventionalist understanding of illocution than that afforded by reading the text as a proof by contradiction.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":46695,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PHILOSOPHIA\",\"volume\":\"2 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PHILOSOPHIA\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00714-8\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHIA","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-024-00714-8","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
How to Read How to Do Things with Words: On Sbisà’s Proof by Contradiction
Midway through How to Do Things With Words, J.L. Austin’s announces a “fresh start” in his efforts to characterize the ways in which speech is action, and introduces a new conceptual framework from the one he has been using up to that point. Against a common reading that portrays this move as simply abandoning the framework so far developed, Marina Sbisà contends that the text takes the argumentative form of a proof by contradiction, such that the initial framework plays an instrumental role as part of a proof in favour of the subsequent one. Despite agreeing with Sbisà’s broad instrumentalist approach, we argue that her regimentation of Austin’s narrative into a proof by contradiction ultimately fails - both as a proof and as an interpretation of Austin. Instead, we suggest that a better way of interpreting the peculiar structure of How to Do Things With Words is as a pedagogical exercise whose point is to bring a concealed alternative into view in a manner that also explains its initial concealment, and that this approach provides richer resources for supporting Sbisà’s own conventionalist understanding of illocution than that afforded by reading the text as a proof by contradiction.
期刊介绍:
Founded in 1971, Philosophia is a much-respected journal that has provided a platform to many well-known philosophers, including Kenneth Arrow, A.J. Ayer, Roderick Chisholm, Bas van Fraassen, William Frankena, P.T. Geach, Alan Gewirth, Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Popkin, W.V.O. Quine, Gilbert Ryle, Marcus Singer, Peter Singer, J.J.C. Smart, P.F. Strawson, and many others. Philosophia also published papers of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap.
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