{"title":"信贷市场重叠项目结构的激励效应","authors":"J.-P. Niinimäki","doi":"10.1016/j.jeconbus.2024.106159","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In this theoretical paper, we examine the risk-shifting problem between lenders and a firm running projects in two different environments. In a synchronous environment, the firm introduces two new 2-period projects that both begin and end on the same date and hence have a new start date in odd-numbered periods. In an asynchronous environment, the firm introduces one new 2-period project in every period: This process creates an overlapping structure for the projects. We show that the set of parameters that allow for reputation-supported lending is larger if projects are asynchronous rather than synchronous. The findings can be generalized to other forms of moral hazard.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":47522,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148619524000018/pdfft?md5=a3263de2b791d7066e6ac7c1ea867502&pid=1-s2.0-S0148619524000018-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The incentive effects of the overlapping project structure in credit markets\",\"authors\":\"J.-P. Niinimäki\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jeconbus.2024.106159\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>In this theoretical paper, we examine the risk-shifting problem between lenders and a firm running projects in two different environments. In a synchronous environment, the firm introduces two new 2-period projects that both begin and end on the same date and hence have a new start date in odd-numbered periods. In an asynchronous environment, the firm introduces one new 2-period project in every period: This process creates an overlapping structure for the projects. We show that the set of parameters that allow for reputation-supported lending is larger if projects are asynchronous rather than synchronous. The findings can be generalized to other forms of moral hazard.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47522,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148619524000018/pdfft?md5=a3263de2b791d7066e6ac7c1ea867502&pid=1-s2.0-S0148619524000018-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148619524000018\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0148619524000018","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The incentive effects of the overlapping project structure in credit markets
In this theoretical paper, we examine the risk-shifting problem between lenders and a firm running projects in two different environments. In a synchronous environment, the firm introduces two new 2-period projects that both begin and end on the same date and hence have a new start date in odd-numbered periods. In an asynchronous environment, the firm introduces one new 2-period project in every period: This process creates an overlapping structure for the projects. We show that the set of parameters that allow for reputation-supported lending is larger if projects are asynchronous rather than synchronous. The findings can be generalized to other forms of moral hazard.
期刊介绍:
Journal of Economics and Business: Studies in Corporate and Financial Behavior. The Journal publishes high quality research papers in all fields of finance and in closely related fields of economics. The Journal is interested in both theoretical and applied research with an emphasis on topics in corporate finance, financial markets and institutions, and investments. Research in real estate, insurance, monetary theory and policy, and industrial organization is also welcomed. Papers that deal with the relation between the financial structure of firms and the industrial structure of the product market are especially encouraged.