信贷市场重叠项目结构的激励效应

IF 3.3 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2024.106159

J.-P. Niinimäki

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在这篇理论论文中，我们研究了贷款人与一家在两种不同环境下运营项目的公司之间的风险转移问题。在同步环境下，企业引入两个新的 2 期项目，它们的开始和结束日期相同，因此在奇数期有一个新的开始日期。在异步环境中，公司在每个周期引入一个新的两周期项目：这一过程形成了项目重叠结构。我们的研究表明，如果项目是异步的而不是同步的，那么允许声誉支持借贷的参数集就会更大。这些发现可以推广到其他形式的道德风险。

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The incentive effects of the overlapping project structure in credit markets

In this theoretical paper, we examine the risk-shifting problem between lenders and a firm running projects in two different environments. In a synchronous environment, the firm introduces two new 2-period projects that both begin and end on the same date and hence have a new start date in odd-numbered periods. In an asynchronous environment, the firm introduces one new 2-period project in every period: This process creates an overlapping structure for the projects. We show that the set of parameters that allow for reputation-supported lending is larger if projects are asynchronous rather than synchronous. The findings can be generalized to other forms of moral hazard.

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来源期刊

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

6.20

自引率

2.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Journal of Economics and Business: Studies in Corporate and Financial Behavior. The Journal publishes high quality research papers in all fields of finance and in closely related fields of economics. The Journal is interested in both theoretical and applied research with an emphasis on topics in corporate finance, financial markets and institutions, and investments. Research in real estate, insurance, monetary theory and policy, and industrial organization is also welcomed. Papers that deal with the relation between the financial structure of firms and the industrial structure of the product market are especially encouraged.