中央银行数字货币：价格与银行稳定性的碰撞

IF 4.3 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Monetary Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.01.007

Linda Schilling , Jesús Fernández-Villaverde , Harald Uhlig

{"title":"中央银行数字货币：价格与银行稳定性的碰撞","authors":"Linda Schilling , Jesús Fernández-Villaverde , Harald Uhlig","doi":"10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.01.007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper shows the existence of a central bank trilemma. When a central bank is involved in financial intermediation, either directly through a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or indirectly through other policy instruments, it can only achieve two of three objectives: a socially efficient allocation, financial stability (i.e., absence of runs), and price stability. In particular, a commitment to price stability can cause a run on the central bank. Implementation of the socially optimal allocation requires a commitment to inflation. We illustrate this idea through a nominal version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. Our perspective may be particularly appropriate when CBDCs are introduced on a wide scale.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48407,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Monetary Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.3000,"publicationDate":"2024-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Central bank digital currency: When price and bank stability collide\",\"authors\":\"Linda Schilling , Jesús Fernández-Villaverde , Harald Uhlig\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.01.007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This paper shows the existence of a central bank trilemma. When a central bank is involved in financial intermediation, either directly through a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or indirectly through other policy instruments, it can only achieve two of three objectives: a socially efficient allocation, financial stability (i.e., absence of runs), and price stability. In particular, a commitment to price stability can cause a run on the central bank. Implementation of the socially optimal allocation requires a commitment to inflation. We illustrate this idea through a nominal version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. Our perspective may be particularly appropriate when CBDCs are introduced on a wide scale.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48407,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Monetary Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Monetary Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393224000072\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Monetary Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304393224000072","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文说明了中央银行三难困境的存在。当中央银行直接通过中央银行数字货币（CBDC）或间接通过其他政策工具参与金融中介时，它只能实现三个目标中的两个：社会有效配置、金融稳定（即不发生挤兑）和价格稳定。特别是，对价格稳定的承诺可能会导致中央银行挤兑。实施社会最优配置需要对通货膨胀做出承诺。我们通过 Diamond 和 Dybvig（1983 年）模型的名义版本来说明这一观点。我们的观点可能特别适用于大范围引入 CBDC 的情况。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Central bank digital currency: When price and bank stability collide

This paper shows the existence of a central bank trilemma. When a central bank is involved in financial intermediation, either directly through a central bank digital currency (CBDC) or indirectly through other policy instruments, it can only achieve two of three objectives: a socially efficient allocation, financial stability (i.e., absence of runs), and price stability. In particular, a commitment to price stability can cause a run on the central bank. Implementation of the socially optimal allocation requires a commitment to inflation. We illustrate this idea through a nominal version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. Our perspective may be particularly appropriate when CBDCs are introduced on a wide scale.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Journal of Monetary Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

7.20

自引率

4.90%

发文量

审稿时长

74 days

期刊介绍： The profession has witnessed over the past twenty years a remarkable expansion of research activities bearing on problems in the broader field of monetary economics. The strong interest in monetary analysis has been increasingly matched in recent years by the growing attention to the working and structure of financial institutions. The role of various institutional arrangements, the consequences of specific changes in banking structure and the welfare aspects of structural policies have attracted an increasing interest in the profession. There has also been a growing attention to the operation of credit markets and to various aspects in the behavior of rates of return on assets. The Journal of Monetary Economics provides a specialized forum for the publication of this research.