跨国公司中间机构及其控制机制的选择

IF 3.9 3区管理学 Q2 MANAGEMENT

Management International Review Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI:10.1007/s11575-023-00527-z

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文分析了跨国公司的中间部门--对其他子公司行使权力的部门--如何应用特定的控制机制：集中化、正规化、结果控制和社会化。我们结合代理理论和网络理论，解释了中间部门作为委托人和代理人的双重代理角色及其网络嵌入性如何形成控制机制的选择。更具体地说，我们就中间单位的内部和外部关系如何决定其对控制机制的选择提出了假设。我们以欧洲跨国公司拥有的、对拉丁美洲子公司行使权力的西班牙中间机构为背景，对这一问题进行了研究。

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MNCs’ Intermediate Units and Their Choice of Control Mechanisms

Abstract

This paper analyzes how MNCs’ intermediate units—those that exercise authority over other subsidiaries—apply specific control mechanisms: centralization, formalization, outcome control, and socialization. We combine agency and network theory to explain how intermediate units’ dual agency role—as both principal and agent— and their network embeddedness form the choice of control mechanisms. More specifically, we propose hypotheses on how the intermediate units’ internal and external relationships determine their choice of control mechanism. We study this issue in the context of Spanish intermediate units —owned by European MNCs— that exercise authority over subsidiaries in Latin America.

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来源期刊

Management International Review MANAGEMENT-

CiteScore

6.50

自引率

11.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Management International Review publishes research-based articles that reflect significant advances in the key areas of International Management. Its target audience consists of scholars in International Business Administration. Management International Review is a double-blind refereed journal that aims at the advancement and dissemination of research in the fields of International Management. The scope of the journal comprises International Business, Cross-Cultural Management, and Comparative Management. The journal publishes research that builds or extends International Management theory so that it can contribute to International Management practice. Management International Review welcomes both theoretical and empirical work. Original papers are invited that are based on a solid theoretical basis and a rigorous methodology. In the area of empirical studies, the journal publishes both quantitative and qualitative research. To be published in Management International Review, a paper must make strong contributions and highlight the significance of those contributions to the field of International Management. The editors are especially interested in manuscripts that break new ground rather than papers that make only incremental contributions. Management International Review publishes articles and research notes. Every year, six issues are published. On average, two of these issues are Focused Issues, which concentrate on a specific subfield of International Management.