库诺-伯特兰模型中的需求信息共享

IF 0.8 4区 管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
Abdul Quadir
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑的是一种具有不确定需求的库诺-伯特兰竞争,在这种竞争中,企业会收到有关需求的私人信息。我们证明,共享信息是数量确定型企业的主导策略,而不共享信息是价格确定型企业的主导策略。我们发现,数量确定型企业在获得更精确的信息后会享有更高的预期利润并汇集信息,而价格确定型企业汇集信息的决定取决于竞争水平和附带支付。消费者从更高的准确性和信息集中中获益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Demand information sharing in Cournot-Bertrand model

We consider a Cournot-Bertrand competition with uncertain demand where firms receive private information about it. We prove that sharing information is a dominant strategy for the quantity-setting firm and not sharing is a dominant strategy for the price-setting firm. We uncover that the quantity-setting firm enjoys higher expected profits with more precise information and pools the information, whereas the price-setting firm's decision to pool the information depends on competition levels and a side payment. Consumers benefit from higher accuracy and pooling of information.

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来源期刊
Operations Research Letters
Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学
CiteScore
2.10
自引率
9.10%
发文量
111
审稿时长
83 days
期刊介绍: Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.
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