特权信息获取、分析师共识建立和股票回报波动:来自 JOBS 法案的证据

IF 1.2 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Shunyao Jin , Michael D. Kimbrough , Isabel Yanyan Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了允许部分分析师在首次公开募股前私下接触管理层是否会影响分析师共识的建立,进而影响首次公开募股后的股票回报波动。2012 年《创业法案》(JOBS)规定了许多豁免条款,以降低符合新兴成长公司(EGC)条件的小型发行人的上市成本。其中一套规定允许 EGC 承销商的附属分析师在 IPO 前与管理层和潜在投资者私下沟通。利用 2001-2022 年间的 IPO 样本,我们发现 EGC 关联分析师的启动预测离散度明显高于 JOBS 实施前的类似 IPO。路径分析显示,JOBS 法案通过关联分析师预测离散度的中介作用,间接导致了 IPO 后股票回报波动性的增加。我们的探索性分析表明,关联分析师社会关系和工作量的显著变化往往与较高的预测离散度有关。总之,我们的研究结果表明,拥有接触管理层的特权可能会减少分析师之间的共识,从而增加 EGC 首次公开募股后的股票回报波动性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Privileged information access, analyst consensus building, and stock return volatility: Evidence from the JOBS Act

This study examines whether allowing select analysts private access to management before an IPO affects analyst consensus building and subsequently post-IPO stock return volatility. The 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act creates many exemptions to reduce the cost of going public for smaller issuers that qualify as an Emerging Growth Company (EGC). One set of provisions allows analysts affiliated with an EGC's underwriters to communicate privately with management and potential investors before the IPO. Using a sample of IPOs during 2001–2022, we find that the dispersion in affiliated analysts' initiation forecasts is significantly higher for EGCs than similar IPOs in the pre-JOBS period. A path analysis reveals that the JOBS Act indirectly contributes to the heightened post-IPO stock return volatility through the mediating role of forecast dispersion among affiliated analysts. Our exploratory analyses suggest that more significant variations in affiliated analysts' social connections and their workload tend to be associated with higher forecast dispersion. Overall, our findings indicate that having privileged access to management could reduce consensus among analysts, which can increase post-IPO stock return volatility in EGCs.

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来源期刊
Advances in Accounting
Advances in Accounting BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
6.20%
发文量
29
期刊介绍: Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in International Accounting continues to provide an important international forum for discourse among and between academic and practicing accountants on the issues of significance. Emphasis continues to be placed on original commentary, critical analysis and creative research.
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