能源转型的博弈:从博弈论角度看基础设施规划中的公众参与程序

IF 2.7 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Eva Ruffing, Viktoria Brendler
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在能源转型过程中,基础设施建设往往是不可或缺的,但同时也是有争议的,并可能对社会凝聚力造成问题。通过博弈论的视角,我们研究了基础设施冲突的基本结构。以德国电网规划的经验为例,我们讨论了解决多层次基础设施冲突的三种方法:(1) 技术官僚决策,(2) 参与式决策,(3) 重新分配和补偿,以及我们可以期待它们缓解冲突的条件。这三种方法中的每一种都在德国电网规划中进行了长期尝试,这使我们能够分析各自的条件是否得到满足,以及为什么这些方法能够(不能)解决现有冲突。我们证明,德国电网扩建中的持久冲突并不是由定义不清的决策程序造成的,而是由一种特别 "邪恶 "的冲突结构造成的,这种结构很难在规划程序中得到解决。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

The game of energy transition: A game theoretical perspective on public participation procedures in infrastructure planning

The game of energy transition: A game theoretical perspective on public participation procedures in infrastructure planning

For energy transition, infrastructure construction is often indispensable but also contested and potentially problematic for social cohesion. Through a game theoretical lens, we examine the basic configuration of infrastructure conflicts. Informed by the empirical example of German electricity grid planning, we discuss three approaches to resolve multilevel infrastructure conflicts, (1) technocratic decision-making, (2) participatory decision-making, and (3) redistribution and compensation, as well as the conditions under which we can expect them to mitigate conflicts. Each of the three approaches has been tried out in German grid planning over time, which allows us to analyze whether the respective conditions were met and why the approaches were (not) able to resolve existing conflicts. We demonstrate that enduring conflicts in German grid expansion are not caused by a fundamentally ill-defined decision-making procedure but rather by a particularly “wicked” conflict structure that can hardly be resolved within planning procedures.

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来源期刊
European Policy Analysis
European Policy Analysis Social Sciences-Public Administration
CiteScore
9.70
自引率
10.00%
发文量
32
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