一次一封邮件,悄无声息地杀死你的小组成员:电子邮件营销的真实成本

IF 9.5 1区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Alina Ferecatu, Arnaud De Bruyn, Prithwiraj Mukherjee
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引用次数: 0

摘要

营销公司经常通过电子邮件与小组成员互动。虽然发送调查问卷回复邀请看起来几乎不需要成本,但过度邀请可能会导致小组成员取消订阅或忽略未来的电子邮件。由于在线小组是市场调研公司的重要资源,因此这种流失是一个重大问题。我们在响应和流失倾向的联合模型中考虑了未观察到的邀请成本。通过使用三年来发送的 15 万多封电子邮件邀请的数据集,我们证明了额外的邀请不仅会暂时降低未来参与的可能性,还会增加流失率,这很可能是由于损耗造成的。该模型中,邀请会 "扼杀 "小组成员的表现优于样本外的基准模型,后者假定流失是由时间流逝造成的。由于邀约的影响既是短暂的(对响应模型的影响),也是永久的(对退出过程的影响),因此管理者应等待暂时的影响消散后,再冒险用另一次邀约 "杀死 "小组成员。我们使用一种差分演化方法来说明这一发现的经济重要性,该方法优化了公司在不同情况下的招标策略,并显示出 30.7% 的改进效果。从长远来看,贪婪策略(以反应最好的小组成员为目标)比随机策略表现更差。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Silently killing your panelists one email at a time: The true cost of email solicitations

Silently killing your panelists one email at a time: The true cost of email solicitations

Marketing firms routinely interact with their panelists via email. While sending an invitation to respond to a survey may seem virtually costless, over-solicitation could lead to panelists unsubscribing or ignoring future emails. Since online panels are a crucial resource for a marketing research firm, such attrition is a major issue. We account for the unobserved cost of solicitations in a joint model of response and attrition propensities. Using a data set of more than 150,000 email solicitations sent over three years, we demonstrate that additional solicitations not only temporarily decrease the likelihood of future participation but also increase the attrition rate, likely due to wearout. The model where solicitations “kill” panelists outperforms out of sample a benchmark model that assumes dropout is caused by the passage of time instead. Since the impact of solicitations is both transient (on the response model) and permanent (on the dropout process), managers should wait for the temporary impact to dissipate before risking to “kill” their panelists with another solicitation. We illustrate the economic importance of this finding using a differential evolution method that optimizes the firm’s solicitation strategy under different scenarios and show a 30.7% improvement. In the long term, a greedy strategy (targeting the best-responding panelists) performs worse than a random policy.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
30.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
82
期刊介绍: JAMS, also known as The Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, plays a crucial role in bridging the gap between scholarly research and practical application in the realm of marketing. Its primary objective is to study and enhance marketing practices by publishing research-driven articles. When manuscripts are submitted to JAMS for publication, they are evaluated based on their potential to contribute to the advancement of marketing science and practice.
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