代表道德现实主义者

IF 1.3 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Gideon Rosen
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引用次数: 0

摘要

克拉克-多恩(Clarke-Doane, 2020 年)这本引人入胜的著作的主要论点是,尽管两种观点之间有许多深刻的相似之处,但数学现实主义是一种站得住脚的立场,而道德现实主义则不然。最后几章为这一论点提出了两个主要论据。安全论证(我称之为 "安全论证")利用一般认识论原则来论证道德现实主义会导致道德怀疑论,因此是站不住脚的,而数学现实主义则没有这样的后果。新开放问题论证(克拉克-多恩称之为 "新开放问题论证")则认为,即使我们能够知道现实主义者所设想的所有道德事实,最重要的道德问题仍然是开放的,因此这些道德问题根本不是关于事实的问题。为了明确起见,我将重点放在那种全面现实主义上,这种现实主义认为道德问题所涉及的事实领域不仅与心灵无关,而且具有不可还原的规范性,因此与实在科学所关注的事实截然不同(Enoch, 2011)。我的道德现实主义赞同克拉克-多恩(Clarke-Doane)所说的客观性,即在唯一真实的道德宇宙中,每一个非模糊的道德主张都是确定的真或假,因此反对大多数形式的相对主义。它还包括反怀疑论的论点,即道德事实往往是可知的,不仅在原则上,而且在普通的方式上。如果克拉克-多恩的论点在任何地方都会带来麻烦,那么在这里也应该会带来麻烦。我想说的是,并没有制造麻烦。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
On behalf of the moral realist

The overarching thesis of Clark-Doane's gripping book (Clarke-Doane, 2020) is that despite the many deep similarities between the views, realism about mathematics is a tenable position whereas moral realism is not. The closing chapters develop two main arguments for this thesis. The Argument from Safety (as I'll call it) wields a general epistemological principle to argue that moral realism leads to moral skepticism and is thus untenable, whereas mathematical realism has no such consequence. The New Open Question Argument (as Clarke-Doane calls it) argues in the alternative that even if we could know all the moral facts as the realist conceives them, the most important moral questions would still be open, and hence that these moral questions are not questions about the facts at all.

In what follows I respond on behalf of the moral realist. For definiteness I focus on the sort of full-strength realism that takes moral questions to concern a domain of fact that is not only mind-independent but irreducibly normative and therefore sharply distinct from the facts with which the positive sciences are concerned (Enoch, 2011). My moral realism endorses what Clarke-Doane calls objectivity — the idea that every non-vague moral claim is determinately true or false in the one true moral universe — and so rejects most forms of relativism. It also includes the antiskeptical thesis that the moral facts are often knowable, not just in principle but in ordinary ways. If Clarke-Doane's arguments make trouble anywhere, they should make trouble here. I'm going to argue that no trouble has been made.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.50
自引率
6.70%
发文量
57
期刊介绍: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research publishes articles in a wide range of areas including philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and philosophical history of philosophy. No specific methodology or philosophical orientation is required for submissions.
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