论具有最大变异成本的真实受限异构设施定位

IF 0.8 4区管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2024-01-01 DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2023.107060

Mohammad Lotfi , Alexandros A. Voudouris

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考虑的问题是，代理人在一条线路上有私人位置，对两个设施有公开的批准偏好，他们的成本是与其批准的设施之间的最大距离。我们的目标是决定设施的位置，使总成本和最大成本最小，同时激励代理人诚实。我们设计了一种防策略机制，该机制对这两个目标函数同时具有 11 和 5 的近似性，从而改进了之前已知的 2n+1 和 9 的界限。

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On truthful constrained heterogeneous facility location with max-variant cost

We consider a problem where agents have private positions on a line, and public approval preferences over two facilities, and their cost is the maximum distance from their approved facilities. The goal is to decide the facility locations to minimize the total and the max cost, while incentivizing the agents to be truthful. We design a strategyproof mechanism that is simultaneously 11- and 5-approximate for these two objective functions, thus improving the previously best-known bounds of $2 n + 1$ and 9.

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来源期刊

Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

111

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.