从强加认知负荷到利用不同策略:对 Brimbal 等人(2023 年)的答复

IF 2.2 2区 社会学 Q1 CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY
Aldert Vrij, Sharon Leal
{"title":"从强加认知负荷到利用不同策略:对 Brimbal 等人(2023 年)的答复","authors":"Aldert Vrij, Sharon Leal","doi":"10.1111/lcrp.12256","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>The reasoning behind lie detection based on imposing cognitive load is as follows. In interview settings lying is typically more mentally taxing than truth telling (Gombos, <span>2006</span>; Walczyk et al., <span>2013</span>). Theoretically, interviewers could exploit this difference by imposing cognitive load. This should affect lie tellers more than truth tellers because lie tellers will have fewer cognitive resources left over than truth tellers. Asking interviewees to recall their stories in reverse order is one way of imposing cognitive load. Although we (Vrij et al., <span>2012</span>) and others (Evans et al., <span>2013</span>) found support for the reverse order lie detection technique, Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) found no support. After failing to replicate our findings, Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) conclude that there may not be sufficient evidence to train the reverse order technique in the field. We came to this conclusion in Vrij and Fisher (<span>2016</span>)—an article cited by Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>)—amongst other reasons because the accuracy rates obtained by imposing cognitive load lie detection techniques are quite low. Two meta-analyses supported this conclusion: 58% accuracy rate for truth tellers and 63% for lie tellers in Vrij et al. (<span>2017</span>) and 58.39% (total accuracy rate) in Mac Giolla and Luke (<span>2021</span>). In other words, we are in full agreement with Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) about the usefulness of using reverse order recall as an imposing cognitive load lie detection technique.</p>\n<p>We still believe in the principle of imposing cognitive load lie detection but have difficulty translating it into a valuable lie detection technique. Apart from reverse order recall, we examined other ways to impose cognitive load, such as instructing interviewees to maintain eye contact with the interviewer (Vrij et al., <span>2010</span>) or to remember a car registration number plate during the recall (Vrij, Deeb, et al., <span>2022</span>). We do not recommend introducing such techniques either. The observable differences were not particularly strong and, although we can give interviewees such imposing cognitive load instructions in the lab, we do not consider it feasible in real life. The closest we came to a successful implementation of imposing cognitive load is in a collective interviewing scenario (interviewing pairs of interviewees together) where we used the forced turn-taking technique (Vernham et al., <span>2014</span>). In forced turn-taking, the interviewer asks one interviewee to starts answering a question. After a short period of time the interviewer will then interrupt the interviewee and will ask the second interviewee to continue with the story. After again a short period of time that person is interrupted, and the first interviewee is asked to continue. Compared to lie telling pairs, truth telling pairs had more fluent continuations in their accounts, whereas lying pairs were more likely to repeat what their partner last said before continuing. Lie telling pairs also waited longer than truth telling pairs with speaking after a turn-take request. A lie detection test revealed an 76.7% accuracy rate when observers were asked to pay attention to these three cues (continuations, repetitions, waiting).</p>\n<p>Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) replicated our finding that truth tellers sounded more plausible than lie tellers. We think this is worth mentioning because we are increasingly interested in plausibility. It typically emerges as a strong (and often the strongest) veracity indicator in our research, see Vrij, Deeb, et al. (<span>2021</span>) for a review, but also Vrij, Leal, et al. (<span>2022</span>) and Chandler et al. (<span>2023</span>). Other researchers also found plausibility to be the strongest veracity indicator (Sporer et al., <span>2021</span>). Plausibility is often used as a veracity cue by laypersons (Hartwig &amp; Bond, <span>2011</span>) and by practitioners (Vrij et al., <span>2023</span>), including in asylum interviews (UNHCR, <span>2013</span>). Several verbal deception researchers, however, do not examine plausibility, although their deception scenarios are well suited for plausibility measurements. We encourage them to start examining plausibility. We think that the verbal lie detection domain cannot ignore examining a cue that works well as a veracity cue in research and is frequently used in the field.</p>\n<p>We found some positive effects of reverse order lie detection recall, but Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) did not. Comparing experiments is problematic and explaining the differences between Vrij et al. (<span>2012</span>) and Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) is speculative. First, the effects Vrij et al. (<span>2012</span>) found were rather weak so there was always a fair chance that it would fail the replication test. In addition, truth tellers and lie tellers in Vrij et al. (<span>2012</span>) were considerably more motivated than those in Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>). According to Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>, p. ????) motivation is unlikely to have impacted their results, citing Hartwig and Bond (<span>2011</span>). We disagree. Hartwig and Bond (<span>2011</span>) did not measure whether motivation affects interviewees' responses in strategic interview protocols. We can easily reason why it would. Truth tellers employ a ‘tell it all’ strategy in interviews (Granhag &amp; Hartwig, <span>2008</span>). This requires considerable effort, even more so in reverse order recall because that is mentally taxing. Truth tellers will put less effort in reporting information if they are less motivated. The less they say, the more they will sound like lie tellers.</p>\n<p>Brimbal et al.'s (<span>2023</span>) lie detection test took place online via MTurk whereas ours took place in-class. MTurk lie detection studies are easy to run and inexpensive, but we find them remote from a real life lie detection experience. Our experience with running in-class lie detection experiments is that observers quickly lose attention. Did the observers in Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) pay attention to the stimulus materials? No check was introduced but attention checks are nowadays recommended (Hauser &amp; Schwartz, <span>2016</span>). The MTurk participants may not have paid much attention because they could make veracity judgements regardless. Of course, attention checks should also be introduced during in-class lie detection tests.</p>\n<p>Our thinking about lie detection has developed since Vrij et al. (<span>2012</span>). Imposing cognitive load is no longer prominent. The rationale of cognitive credibility assessment (CCA) is that the strategies used by truth tellers (tell it all) and lie tellers (keep it simple) are different (Strömwall &amp; Willén, <span>2011</span>) and that these differences can be exploited. Truth tellers do not spontaneously report all information (Vrij et al., <span>2014</span>) because (i) they do not know how much they are required to say, (ii) are not motivated to tell it all or (iii) find it difficult to retrieve information from memory. CCA uses techniques to facilitate these three aspects and that includes reverse order recall, a memory-enhancement tool (Vrij, Granhag, et al., <span>2022</span>; Vrij, Mann, et al., <span>2021</span>). These techniques should have a larger effect on truth tellers than on lie tellers because lie tellers prefer to keep their stories simple to (i) avoid reporting incriminating evidence, (ii) remain consistent if interviewed multiple times and (iii) make story telling easier.</p>\n<p>Others also include reverse order recall in their protocols (Bogaard et al., <span>2019</span>; Colwell et al., <span>2009</span>). The reverse order recall is part of the cognitive interview (Fisher &amp; Geiselman, <span>2019</span>), an interview tool that facilitates memory recall in cooperative witnesses (truth tellers) (Memon et al., <span>2010</span>). Similar to the cognitive interview, in CCA, after some recall attempts, interviewees are invited to report the event again but this time in reverse order. The reverse order recall instruction invites truth tellers to think about the event again from a different perspective, which often leads to new information. A reverse order recall is less likely to lead to new information in lie tellers due to their inclination to keep their stories simple. In other words, nowadays we—and others (Bogaard et al., <span>2019</span>; Colwell et al., <span>2009</span>)—use reverse order recall as a memory-enhancement tool in a cluster of ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ techniques (Vrij, Mann, et al., <span>2021</span>). We predicted and found that truth tellers report more additional information after a reverse order recall instruction than lie tellers (Ewens et al., <span>2016</span>; Shaw et al., <span>2014</span>; Vrij, Mann, et al., <span>2021</span>).</p>\n<p>We started our cognitive lie detection research with imposing cognitive load manipulations (e.g. Vrij et al., <span>2008</span>) but moved on from that. We asked researchers to explore cognitive lie detection (Vrij et al., <span>2008</span>) and many researchers took this up. Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) propose more replication studies. Others prefer to carry out innovative research by designing new techniques, such as the strategic use of evidence (Granhag &amp; Hartwig, <span>2015</span>; Oleszkiewicz &amp; Watson, <span>2021</span>) and the verifiability approach (Nahari, <span>2019</span>).</p>","PeriodicalId":18022,"journal":{"name":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"From imposing cognitive load to exploiting different strategies: A reply to Brimbal et al. (2023)\",\"authors\":\"Aldert Vrij, Sharon Leal\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/lcrp.12256\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>The reasoning behind lie detection based on imposing cognitive load is as follows. In interview settings lying is typically more mentally taxing than truth telling (Gombos, <span>2006</span>; Walczyk et al., <span>2013</span>). Theoretically, interviewers could exploit this difference by imposing cognitive load. This should affect lie tellers more than truth tellers because lie tellers will have fewer cognitive resources left over than truth tellers. Asking interviewees to recall their stories in reverse order is one way of imposing cognitive load. Although we (Vrij et al., <span>2012</span>) and others (Evans et al., <span>2013</span>) found support for the reverse order lie detection technique, Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) found no support. After failing to replicate our findings, Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) conclude that there may not be sufficient evidence to train the reverse order technique in the field. We came to this conclusion in Vrij and Fisher (<span>2016</span>)—an article cited by Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>)—amongst other reasons because the accuracy rates obtained by imposing cognitive load lie detection techniques are quite low. Two meta-analyses supported this conclusion: 58% accuracy rate for truth tellers and 63% for lie tellers in Vrij et al. (<span>2017</span>) and 58.39% (total accuracy rate) in Mac Giolla and Luke (<span>2021</span>). In other words, we are in full agreement with Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) about the usefulness of using reverse order recall as an imposing cognitive load lie detection technique.</p>\\n<p>We still believe in the principle of imposing cognitive load lie detection but have difficulty translating it into a valuable lie detection technique. Apart from reverse order recall, we examined other ways to impose cognitive load, such as instructing interviewees to maintain eye contact with the interviewer (Vrij et al., <span>2010</span>) or to remember a car registration number plate during the recall (Vrij, Deeb, et al., <span>2022</span>). We do not recommend introducing such techniques either. The observable differences were not particularly strong and, although we can give interviewees such imposing cognitive load instructions in the lab, we do not consider it feasible in real life. The closest we came to a successful implementation of imposing cognitive load is in a collective interviewing scenario (interviewing pairs of interviewees together) where we used the forced turn-taking technique (Vernham et al., <span>2014</span>). In forced turn-taking, the interviewer asks one interviewee to starts answering a question. After a short period of time the interviewer will then interrupt the interviewee and will ask the second interviewee to continue with the story. After again a short period of time that person is interrupted, and the first interviewee is asked to continue. Compared to lie telling pairs, truth telling pairs had more fluent continuations in their accounts, whereas lying pairs were more likely to repeat what their partner last said before continuing. Lie telling pairs also waited longer than truth telling pairs with speaking after a turn-take request. A lie detection test revealed an 76.7% accuracy rate when observers were asked to pay attention to these three cues (continuations, repetitions, waiting).</p>\\n<p>Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) replicated our finding that truth tellers sounded more plausible than lie tellers. We think this is worth mentioning because we are increasingly interested in plausibility. It typically emerges as a strong (and often the strongest) veracity indicator in our research, see Vrij, Deeb, et al. (<span>2021</span>) for a review, but also Vrij, Leal, et al. (<span>2022</span>) and Chandler et al. (<span>2023</span>). Other researchers also found plausibility to be the strongest veracity indicator (Sporer et al., <span>2021</span>). Plausibility is often used as a veracity cue by laypersons (Hartwig &amp; Bond, <span>2011</span>) and by practitioners (Vrij et al., <span>2023</span>), including in asylum interviews (UNHCR, <span>2013</span>). Several verbal deception researchers, however, do not examine plausibility, although their deception scenarios are well suited for plausibility measurements. We encourage them to start examining plausibility. We think that the verbal lie detection domain cannot ignore examining a cue that works well as a veracity cue in research and is frequently used in the field.</p>\\n<p>We found some positive effects of reverse order lie detection recall, but Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) did not. Comparing experiments is problematic and explaining the differences between Vrij et al. (<span>2012</span>) and Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) is speculative. First, the effects Vrij et al. (<span>2012</span>) found were rather weak so there was always a fair chance that it would fail the replication test. In addition, truth tellers and lie tellers in Vrij et al. (<span>2012</span>) were considerably more motivated than those in Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>). According to Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>, p. ????) motivation is unlikely to have impacted their results, citing Hartwig and Bond (<span>2011</span>). We disagree. Hartwig and Bond (<span>2011</span>) did not measure whether motivation affects interviewees' responses in strategic interview protocols. We can easily reason why it would. Truth tellers employ a ‘tell it all’ strategy in interviews (Granhag &amp; Hartwig, <span>2008</span>). This requires considerable effort, even more so in reverse order recall because that is mentally taxing. Truth tellers will put less effort in reporting information if they are less motivated. The less they say, the more they will sound like lie tellers.</p>\\n<p>Brimbal et al.'s (<span>2023</span>) lie detection test took place online via MTurk whereas ours took place in-class. MTurk lie detection studies are easy to run and inexpensive, but we find them remote from a real life lie detection experience. Our experience with running in-class lie detection experiments is that observers quickly lose attention. Did the observers in Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) pay attention to the stimulus materials? No check was introduced but attention checks are nowadays recommended (Hauser &amp; Schwartz, <span>2016</span>). The MTurk participants may not have paid much attention because they could make veracity judgements regardless. Of course, attention checks should also be introduced during in-class lie detection tests.</p>\\n<p>Our thinking about lie detection has developed since Vrij et al. (<span>2012</span>). Imposing cognitive load is no longer prominent. The rationale of cognitive credibility assessment (CCA) is that the strategies used by truth tellers (tell it all) and lie tellers (keep it simple) are different (Strömwall &amp; Willén, <span>2011</span>) and that these differences can be exploited. Truth tellers do not spontaneously report all information (Vrij et al., <span>2014</span>) because (i) they do not know how much they are required to say, (ii) are not motivated to tell it all or (iii) find it difficult to retrieve information from memory. CCA uses techniques to facilitate these three aspects and that includes reverse order recall, a memory-enhancement tool (Vrij, Granhag, et al., <span>2022</span>; Vrij, Mann, et al., <span>2021</span>). These techniques should have a larger effect on truth tellers than on lie tellers because lie tellers prefer to keep their stories simple to (i) avoid reporting incriminating evidence, (ii) remain consistent if interviewed multiple times and (iii) make story telling easier.</p>\\n<p>Others also include reverse order recall in their protocols (Bogaard et al., <span>2019</span>; Colwell et al., <span>2009</span>). The reverse order recall is part of the cognitive interview (Fisher &amp; Geiselman, <span>2019</span>), an interview tool that facilitates memory recall in cooperative witnesses (truth tellers) (Memon et al., <span>2010</span>). Similar to the cognitive interview, in CCA, after some recall attempts, interviewees are invited to report the event again but this time in reverse order. The reverse order recall instruction invites truth tellers to think about the event again from a different perspective, which often leads to new information. A reverse order recall is less likely to lead to new information in lie tellers due to their inclination to keep their stories simple. In other words, nowadays we—and others (Bogaard et al., <span>2019</span>; Colwell et al., <span>2009</span>)—use reverse order recall as a memory-enhancement tool in a cluster of ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ techniques (Vrij, Mann, et al., <span>2021</span>). We predicted and found that truth tellers report more additional information after a reverse order recall instruction than lie tellers (Ewens et al., <span>2016</span>; Shaw et al., <span>2014</span>; Vrij, Mann, et al., <span>2021</span>).</p>\\n<p>We started our cognitive lie detection research with imposing cognitive load manipulations (e.g. Vrij et al., <span>2008</span>) but moved on from that. We asked researchers to explore cognitive lie detection (Vrij et al., <span>2008</span>) and many researchers took this up. Brimbal et al. (<span>2023</span>) propose more replication studies. Others prefer to carry out innovative research by designing new techniques, such as the strategic use of evidence (Granhag &amp; Hartwig, <span>2015</span>; Oleszkiewicz &amp; Watson, <span>2021</span>) and the verifiability approach (Nahari, <span>2019</span>).</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":18022,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Legal and Criminological Psychology\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Legal and Criminological Psychology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"102\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12256\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legal and Criminological Psychology","FirstCategoryId":"102","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/lcrp.12256","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY","Score":null,"Total":0}
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摘要

基于认知负荷的测谎原理如下。在面试环境中,说谎通常比说真话更耗费脑力(Gombos,2006;Walczyk 等人,2013)。从理论上讲,面试官可以通过施加认知负荷来利用这种差异。这对说谎话者的影响应该大于说真话者,因为说谎话者比说真话者剩余的认知资源更少。要求受访者倒序回忆自己的故事就是施加认知负荷的一种方法。虽然我们(Vrij 等人,2012 年)和其他人(Evans 等人,2013 年)发现倒序测谎技术得到了支持,但 Brimbal 等人(2023 年)却没有发现支持。在未能复制我们的研究结果后,Brimbal 等人(2023 年)得出结论:可能没有足够的证据在现场训练倒序测谎技术。我们在《Vrij 和 Fisher》(2016 年)中得出这一结论--Brimbal 等人(2023 年)引用了这篇文章--除其他原因外,还因为施加认知负荷的测谎技术获得的准确率相当低。两项荟萃分析支持了这一结论:Vrij 等人(2017 年)的研究显示,说真话者的准确率为 58%,说谎话者的准确率为 63%;Mac Giolla 和 Luke(2021 年)的研究显示,说谎话者的准确率为 58.39%(总准确率)。换句话说,我们与 Brimbal 等人(2023 年)的观点完全一致,即使用逆序回忆作为强加认知负荷测谎技术是有用的。我们仍然相信强加认知负荷测谎的原理,但难以将其转化为有价值的测谎技术。除倒序回忆外,我们还研究了其他施加认知负荷的方法,如指示受访者与访谈者保持眼神接触(Vrij 等人,2010 年)或在回忆过程中记住汽车登记号码牌(Vrij、Deeb 等人,2022 年)。我们也不建议引入此类技巧。可观察到的差异并不是特别大,而且,尽管我们可以在实验室中向受访者下达这种强加认知负荷的指令,但我们认为这在现实生活中并不可行。我们最接近成功实施强加认知负荷的方法是在集体访谈场景中(一起访谈两对受访者)使用强制轮流技术(Vernham 等人,2014 年)。在 "强制轮流 "中,访谈者要求一名受访者开始回答一个问题。过一小段时间后,访谈者会打断受访者,并要求第二位受访者继续讲述。再过一小段时间,该受访者被打断,然后要求第一位受访者继续。与说谎话的受试者相比,说真话的受试者在继续讲述时更加流畅,而说谎话的受试者则更有可能在继续讲述之前重复其同伴上次所说的话。此外,说假话的配对在收到转接要求后等待发言的时间也比说真话的配对长。布林巴尔等人(2023 年)重复了我们的发现,即说真话的人比说假话的人听起来更可信。我们认为这一点值得一提,因为我们对可信度越来越感兴趣。在我们的研究中,它通常是一个强有力的(而且往往是最强有力的)真实性指标,参见 Vrij、Deeb 等人(2021 年)的综述,以及 Vrij、Leal 等人(2022 年)和 Chandler 等人(2023 年)的综述。其他研究人员也发现可信度是最强的真实性指标(Sporer 等人,2021 年)。可信度经常被非专业人士(Hartwig &amp; Bond, 2011)和从业人员(Vrij et al., 2023)用作真实性线索,包括在庇护访谈中(UNHCR, 2013)。然而,一些言语欺骗研究人员并不研究可信度,尽管他们的欺骗情景非常适合可信度测量。我们鼓励他们开始研究可信度。我们认为,言语测谎领域不能忽视对一种线索的研究,这种线索在研究中作为真实性线索效果很好,而且在该领域经常使用。我们发现逆序测谎回忆有一些积极影响,但 Brimbal 等人(2023 年)没有发现。比较实验是有问题的,而解释 Vrij 等人(2012 年)和 Brimbal 等人(2023 年)之间的差异也是推测性的。首先,Vrij 等人(2012 年)发现的效果相当微弱,因此总是有可能无法通过复制测试。此外,与 Brimbal 等人(2023 年)的研究相比,Vrij 等人(2012 年)研究中的说真话者和说谎话者的动机要强得多。Brimbal 等人(2023 年,第 ???? 页)引用 Hartwig 和 Bond(2011 年)的话说,动机不太可能影响他们的结果。我们不同意这一观点。Hartwig 和 Bond(2011 年)没有测量动机是否会影响受访者在策略访谈协议中的回答。 我们很容易推理出为什么会这样。说实话的人在访谈中会采用 "全盘托出 "的策略(Granhag &amp; Hartwig, 2008)。这需要付出相当大的努力,在倒序回忆时更是如此,因为这很耗费脑力。说真话的人如果动机不强,在报告信息时付出的努力就会减少。Brimbal 等人(2023 年)的测谎测试是通过 MTurk 在线进行的,而我们的测试是在课堂上进行的。MTurk 测谎研究易于进行,而且成本低廉,但我们发现它们与现实生活中的测谎体验相去甚远。我们在课堂上进行测谎实验的经验是,观察者很快就会失去注意力。Brimbal 等人(2023 年)的观察者是否注意了刺激材料?没有引入检查,但如今建议进行注意力检查(Hauser &amp; Schwartz, 2016)。MTurk 的参与者可能没有太注意,因为他们可以做出真实性判断。当然,在课堂测谎测试中也应引入注意力检查。自 Vrij 等人(2012 年)之后,我们对测谎的思考有了新的发展。自 Vrij 等人(2012 年)以来,我们对测谎的思考有了新的发展。认知可信度评估(CCA)的基本原理是,说真话的人(全盘托出)和说谎话的人(保持简单)所使用的策略是不同的(Strömwall &amp; Willén, 2011),这些差异是可以利用的。说真话的人不会自发地报告所有信息(Vrij 等人,2014 年),因为 (i) 他们不知道自己需要说多少,(ii) 没有动力说出全部,或 (iii) 发现很难从记忆中检索信息。CCA 采用了一些技术来促进这三个方面,其中包括逆序回忆这一增强记忆的工具(Vrij、Granhag 等人,2022 年;Vrij、Mann 等人,2021 年)。这些技巧对说真话者的影响应该大于说谎话者,因为说谎话者更喜欢让自己的故事简单,以便(i)避免报告罪证,(ii)在多次询问时保持一致,以及(iii)使故事更容易讲述。逆序回忆是认知访谈(Fisher &amp; Geiselman, 2019)的一部分,认知访谈是一种促进合作证人(真相讲述者)回忆记忆的访谈工具(Memon 等人,2010 年)。与认知访谈类似,在 CCA 中,受访者在尝试回忆一些事件后,会被邀请再次报告事件,但这次要按照相反的顺序。倒序回忆指令会让真相讲述者从不同的角度再次思考事件,这往往会带来新的信息。而对于说谎者来说,倒序回忆不太可能带来新的信息,因为他们倾向于保持故事的简单性。换句话说,如今我们--还有其他人(Bogaard 等人,2019 年;Colwell 等人,2009 年)--将倒序回忆作为 "鼓励受访者多说 "技巧中的一种增强记忆的工具(Vrij、Mann 等人,2021 年)。我们预测并发现,与说谎者相比,说真话者在接受倒序回忆指令后会报告更多的额外信息(Ewens 等人,2016 年;Shaw 等人,2014 年;Vrij、Mann 等人,2021 年)。我们要求研究人员探索认知测谎(Vrij 等人,2008 年),许多研究人员接受了这一要求。Brimbal 等人(2023 年)建议进行更多的复制研究。其他研究人员则倾向于通过设计新技术开展创新研究,如证据的战略性使用(Granhag &amp; Hartwig, 2015; Oleszkiewicz &amp; Watson, 2021)和可验证性方法(Nahari, 2019)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
From imposing cognitive load to exploiting different strategies: A reply to Brimbal et al. (2023)

The reasoning behind lie detection based on imposing cognitive load is as follows. In interview settings lying is typically more mentally taxing than truth telling (Gombos, 2006; Walczyk et al., 2013). Theoretically, interviewers could exploit this difference by imposing cognitive load. This should affect lie tellers more than truth tellers because lie tellers will have fewer cognitive resources left over than truth tellers. Asking interviewees to recall their stories in reverse order is one way of imposing cognitive load. Although we (Vrij et al., 2012) and others (Evans et al., 2013) found support for the reverse order lie detection technique, Brimbal et al. (2023) found no support. After failing to replicate our findings, Brimbal et al. (2023) conclude that there may not be sufficient evidence to train the reverse order technique in the field. We came to this conclusion in Vrij and Fisher (2016)—an article cited by Brimbal et al. (2023)—amongst other reasons because the accuracy rates obtained by imposing cognitive load lie detection techniques are quite low. Two meta-analyses supported this conclusion: 58% accuracy rate for truth tellers and 63% for lie tellers in Vrij et al. (2017) and 58.39% (total accuracy rate) in Mac Giolla and Luke (2021). In other words, we are in full agreement with Brimbal et al. (2023) about the usefulness of using reverse order recall as an imposing cognitive load lie detection technique.

We still believe in the principle of imposing cognitive load lie detection but have difficulty translating it into a valuable lie detection technique. Apart from reverse order recall, we examined other ways to impose cognitive load, such as instructing interviewees to maintain eye contact with the interviewer (Vrij et al., 2010) or to remember a car registration number plate during the recall (Vrij, Deeb, et al., 2022). We do not recommend introducing such techniques either. The observable differences were not particularly strong and, although we can give interviewees such imposing cognitive load instructions in the lab, we do not consider it feasible in real life. The closest we came to a successful implementation of imposing cognitive load is in a collective interviewing scenario (interviewing pairs of interviewees together) where we used the forced turn-taking technique (Vernham et al., 2014). In forced turn-taking, the interviewer asks one interviewee to starts answering a question. After a short period of time the interviewer will then interrupt the interviewee and will ask the second interviewee to continue with the story. After again a short period of time that person is interrupted, and the first interviewee is asked to continue. Compared to lie telling pairs, truth telling pairs had more fluent continuations in their accounts, whereas lying pairs were more likely to repeat what their partner last said before continuing. Lie telling pairs also waited longer than truth telling pairs with speaking after a turn-take request. A lie detection test revealed an 76.7% accuracy rate when observers were asked to pay attention to these three cues (continuations, repetitions, waiting).

Brimbal et al. (2023) replicated our finding that truth tellers sounded more plausible than lie tellers. We think this is worth mentioning because we are increasingly interested in plausibility. It typically emerges as a strong (and often the strongest) veracity indicator in our research, see Vrij, Deeb, et al. (2021) for a review, but also Vrij, Leal, et al. (2022) and Chandler et al. (2023). Other researchers also found plausibility to be the strongest veracity indicator (Sporer et al., 2021). Plausibility is often used as a veracity cue by laypersons (Hartwig & Bond, 2011) and by practitioners (Vrij et al., 2023), including in asylum interviews (UNHCR, 2013). Several verbal deception researchers, however, do not examine plausibility, although their deception scenarios are well suited for plausibility measurements. We encourage them to start examining plausibility. We think that the verbal lie detection domain cannot ignore examining a cue that works well as a veracity cue in research and is frequently used in the field.

We found some positive effects of reverse order lie detection recall, but Brimbal et al. (2023) did not. Comparing experiments is problematic and explaining the differences between Vrij et al. (2012) and Brimbal et al. (2023) is speculative. First, the effects Vrij et al. (2012) found were rather weak so there was always a fair chance that it would fail the replication test. In addition, truth tellers and lie tellers in Vrij et al. (2012) were considerably more motivated than those in Brimbal et al. (2023). According to Brimbal et al. (2023, p. ????) motivation is unlikely to have impacted their results, citing Hartwig and Bond (2011). We disagree. Hartwig and Bond (2011) did not measure whether motivation affects interviewees' responses in strategic interview protocols. We can easily reason why it would. Truth tellers employ a ‘tell it all’ strategy in interviews (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). This requires considerable effort, even more so in reverse order recall because that is mentally taxing. Truth tellers will put less effort in reporting information if they are less motivated. The less they say, the more they will sound like lie tellers.

Brimbal et al.'s (2023) lie detection test took place online via MTurk whereas ours took place in-class. MTurk lie detection studies are easy to run and inexpensive, but we find them remote from a real life lie detection experience. Our experience with running in-class lie detection experiments is that observers quickly lose attention. Did the observers in Brimbal et al. (2023) pay attention to the stimulus materials? No check was introduced but attention checks are nowadays recommended (Hauser & Schwartz, 2016). The MTurk participants may not have paid much attention because they could make veracity judgements regardless. Of course, attention checks should also be introduced during in-class lie detection tests.

Our thinking about lie detection has developed since Vrij et al. (2012). Imposing cognitive load is no longer prominent. The rationale of cognitive credibility assessment (CCA) is that the strategies used by truth tellers (tell it all) and lie tellers (keep it simple) are different (Strömwall & Willén, 2011) and that these differences can be exploited. Truth tellers do not spontaneously report all information (Vrij et al., 2014) because (i) they do not know how much they are required to say, (ii) are not motivated to tell it all or (iii) find it difficult to retrieve information from memory. CCA uses techniques to facilitate these three aspects and that includes reverse order recall, a memory-enhancement tool (Vrij, Granhag, et al., 2022; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2021). These techniques should have a larger effect on truth tellers than on lie tellers because lie tellers prefer to keep their stories simple to (i) avoid reporting incriminating evidence, (ii) remain consistent if interviewed multiple times and (iii) make story telling easier.

Others also include reverse order recall in their protocols (Bogaard et al., 2019; Colwell et al., 2009). The reverse order recall is part of the cognitive interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 2019), an interview tool that facilitates memory recall in cooperative witnesses (truth tellers) (Memon et al., 2010). Similar to the cognitive interview, in CCA, after some recall attempts, interviewees are invited to report the event again but this time in reverse order. The reverse order recall instruction invites truth tellers to think about the event again from a different perspective, which often leads to new information. A reverse order recall is less likely to lead to new information in lie tellers due to their inclination to keep their stories simple. In other words, nowadays we—and others (Bogaard et al., 2019; Colwell et al., 2009)—use reverse order recall as a memory-enhancement tool in a cluster of ‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ techniques (Vrij, Mann, et al., 2021). We predicted and found that truth tellers report more additional information after a reverse order recall instruction than lie tellers (Ewens et al., 2016; Shaw et al., 2014; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2021).

We started our cognitive lie detection research with imposing cognitive load manipulations (e.g. Vrij et al., 2008) but moved on from that. We asked researchers to explore cognitive lie detection (Vrij et al., 2008) and many researchers took this up. Brimbal et al. (2023) propose more replication studies. Others prefer to carry out innovative research by designing new techniques, such as the strategic use of evidence (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; Oleszkiewicz & Watson, 2021) and the verifiability approach (Nahari, 2019).

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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
31
期刊介绍: Legal and Criminological Psychology publishes original papers in all areas of psychology and law: - victimology - policing and crime detection - crime prevention - management of offenders - mental health and the law - public attitudes to law - role of the expert witness - impact of law on behaviour - interviewing and eyewitness testimony - jury decision making - deception The journal publishes papers which advance professional and scientific knowledge defined broadly as the application of psychology to law and interdisciplinary enquiry in legal and psychological fields.
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