{"title":"只是概率","authors":"Chad Lee-Stronach","doi":"10.1111/nous.12486","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I defend the thesis that legal standards of proof are reducible to thresholds of probability. Many reject this thesis because it appears to permit finding defendants liable solely on the basis of statistical evidence. To the contrary, I argue – by combining Thomson's (1986) causal analysis of legal evidence with formal methods of causal inference – that legal standards of proof can be reduced to probabilities, but that deriving these probabilities involves more than just statistics.","PeriodicalId":501006,"journal":{"name":"Noûs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Just probabilities\",\"authors\":\"Chad Lee-Stronach\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/nous.12486\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I defend the thesis that legal standards of proof are reducible to thresholds of probability. Many reject this thesis because it appears to permit finding defendants liable solely on the basis of statistical evidence. To the contrary, I argue – by combining Thomson's (1986) causal analysis of legal evidence with formal methods of causal inference – that legal standards of proof can be reduced to probabilities, but that deriving these probabilities involves more than just statistics.\",\"PeriodicalId\":501006,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Noûs\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Noûs\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12486\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Noûs","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12486","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
I defend the thesis that legal standards of proof are reducible to thresholds of probability. Many reject this thesis because it appears to permit finding defendants liable solely on the basis of statistical evidence. To the contrary, I argue – by combining Thomson's (1986) causal analysis of legal evidence with formal methods of causal inference – that legal standards of proof can be reduced to probabilities, but that deriving these probabilities involves more than just statistics.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
