一切政治始于地方:国家责任与国家以下各级劳动力市场

IF 5.7 2区 管理学 Q1 BUSINESS
Cheng Li, Klaus Meyer
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引用次数: 0

摘要

国有控股收购方面临国有责任(LoS),因为东道国利益相关者认为它们的合法性较低,是外国政治权力的代表。我们认为,由于国有责任,国有企业在跨国收购中面临的监管审查要多于同类私营企业。从投票行为的角度出发,我们进一步假设,如果收购是通过中介机构进行的,而且收购所在的社区由于当地的劳动力条件不那么排斥国有企业,那么这种监管审查的增加就会减少。通过对来自 44 个经济体的收购方和美国 50 个州的目标企业的跨境收购进行抽样调查,我们发现国有企业比私营企业更有可能受到额外的监管审查,后者的可能性要高出 9%。然而,这种可能性在间接收购和高失业率的东道国地区会降低。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
All politics starts local: Liability of stateness and subnational labor markets
State-controlled acquirers face a liability of stateness (LoS) because host country stakeholders consider them less legitimate and as representatives of foreign political power. We argue that due to LoS, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face more regulatory scrutiny in cross-border acquisitions than comparable private-owned enterprises (POEs). Applying a voting behavior perspective, we further posit this increased regulatory scrutiny is reduced when acquisitions occur via intermediaries, and in host communities less averse to state ownership due to local labor conditions. Using a sample of cross-border acquisitions with acquirers from 44 economies and targets in 50 US states, we find that SOEs are 9% more likely to attract additional regulatory scrutiny than POEs. However, this likelihood decreases with indirect acquisitions and in host regions with high unemployment.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
14.20
自引率
11.80%
发文量
46
期刊介绍: The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.
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