{"title":"一切政治始于地方:国家责任与国家以下各级劳动力市场","authors":"Cheng Li, Klaus Meyer","doi":"10.1002/gsj.1500","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"State-controlled acquirers face a liability of stateness (LoS) because host country stakeholders consider them less legitimate and as representatives of foreign political power. We argue that due to LoS, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face more regulatory scrutiny in cross-border acquisitions than comparable private-owned enterprises (POEs). Applying a voting behavior perspective, we further posit this increased regulatory scrutiny is reduced when acquisitions occur via intermediaries, and in host communities less averse to state ownership due to local labor conditions. Using a sample of cross-border acquisitions with acquirers from 44 economies and targets in 50 US states, we find that SOEs are 9% more likely to attract additional regulatory scrutiny than POEs. However, this likelihood decreases with indirect acquisitions and in host regions with high unemployment.","PeriodicalId":47563,"journal":{"name":"Global Strategy Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"All politics starts local: Liability of stateness and subnational labor markets\",\"authors\":\"Cheng Li, Klaus Meyer\",\"doi\":\"10.1002/gsj.1500\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"State-controlled acquirers face a liability of stateness (LoS) because host country stakeholders consider them less legitimate and as representatives of foreign political power. We argue that due to LoS, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face more regulatory scrutiny in cross-border acquisitions than comparable private-owned enterprises (POEs). Applying a voting behavior perspective, we further posit this increased regulatory scrutiny is reduced when acquisitions occur via intermediaries, and in host communities less averse to state ownership due to local labor conditions. Using a sample of cross-border acquisitions with acquirers from 44 economies and targets in 50 US states, we find that SOEs are 9% more likely to attract additional regulatory scrutiny than POEs. However, this likelihood decreases with indirect acquisitions and in host regions with high unemployment.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47563,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Global Strategy Journal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Global Strategy Journal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1500\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Global Strategy Journal","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1002/gsj.1500","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
All politics starts local: Liability of stateness and subnational labor markets
State-controlled acquirers face a liability of stateness (LoS) because host country stakeholders consider them less legitimate and as representatives of foreign political power. We argue that due to LoS, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) face more regulatory scrutiny in cross-border acquisitions than comparable private-owned enterprises (POEs). Applying a voting behavior perspective, we further posit this increased regulatory scrutiny is reduced when acquisitions occur via intermediaries, and in host communities less averse to state ownership due to local labor conditions. Using a sample of cross-border acquisitions with acquirers from 44 economies and targets in 50 US states, we find that SOEs are 9% more likely to attract additional regulatory scrutiny than POEs. However, this likelihood decreases with indirect acquisitions and in host regions with high unemployment.
期刊介绍:
The Global Strategy Journal is a premier platform dedicated to publishing highly influential managerially-oriented global strategy research worldwide. Covering themes such as international and global strategy, assembling the global enterprise, and strategic management, GSJ plays a vital role in advancing our understanding of global business dynamics.