NBA 关键时刻的最佳暂停选择

IF 1.8 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Sports Economics Pub Date : 2023-12-03 DOI:10.1177/15270025231217961

Michael Allgrunn, Christopher Douglas, Sebastian Wai

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在第四节，当得分时间结束但控球落后时，美国职业篮球协会(NBA)的教练们面临着一个决定:暂停，重新安排比赛，还是继续比赛。利用16,839场NBA比赛的详细数据，我们发现暂停会使球队成功控球的机会降低5.7个百分点。教练可能会认为暂停是安全的决定，因为失败的责任会落在球员没有执行比赛，而不是教练没有叫暂停。这种次优行为表明，球队老板和教练之间存在委托代理问题。

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Optimal Timeout Choices in Clutch Situations in the NBA

When down by a possession in fourth quarter with the shot clock off and possessing the ball, National Basketball Association (NBA) coaches face a decision: take a timeout and draw up a play or let play continue. Utilizing play-by-play data for 16,839 NBA games, we find taking a timeout lowers a team's chances of a successful possession by 5.7 percentage points. Coaches might view taking a timeout as the safe decision, since blame for the loss would fall on the players for not executing the play, not on the coach for failing to call one. This suboptimal behavior suggests there is a principal–agent problem between team owners and coaches.

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来源期刊

Journal of Sports Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

17.60%

发文量

期刊介绍： Journal of Sports Economics publishes scholarly research in the field of sports economics. The aim of the journal is to further research in the area of sports economics by bringing together theoretical and empirical research in a single intellectual venue. Relevant topics include: labor market research; labor-management relations; collective bargaining; wage determination; local public finance; and other fields related to the economics of sports. Published quarterly, the Journal of Sports Economics is unique in that it is the only journal devoted specifically to this rapidly growing field.