立法监督中的信息与对抗

IF 1.4 3区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Ayse Eldes, Christian Fong, Kenneth Lowande
{"title":"立法监督中的信息与对抗","authors":"Ayse Eldes,&nbsp;Christian Fong,&nbsp;Kenneth Lowande","doi":"10.1111/lsq.12440","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Committees can use oversight hearings to collect and communicate the information Congress needs to oversee the bureaucracy, but many worry that members instead focus on scoring political points by lambasting witnesses. We leverage the collective judgment of congressional staff to measure how exchanges between legislators and witnesses vary on two separable dimensions: information and confrontation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that confrontation crowds out information, we show that members of the president's party engage in less confrontational oversight and reveal no more or less information than their peers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47672,"journal":{"name":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","volume":"49 2","pages":"227-256"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12440","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Information and Confrontation in Legislative Oversight\",\"authors\":\"Ayse Eldes,&nbsp;Christian Fong,&nbsp;Kenneth Lowande\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/lsq.12440\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Committees can use oversight hearings to collect and communicate the information Congress needs to oversee the bureaucracy, but many worry that members instead focus on scoring political points by lambasting witnesses. We leverage the collective judgment of congressional staff to measure how exchanges between legislators and witnesses vary on two separable dimensions: information and confrontation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that confrontation crowds out information, we show that members of the president's party engage in less confrontational oversight and reveal no more or less information than their peers.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47672,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Legislative Studies Quarterly\",\"volume\":\"49 2\",\"pages\":\"227-256\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/lsq.12440\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Legislative Studies Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsq.12440\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legislative Studies Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/lsq.12440","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

委员会可以利用监督听证会来收集和传达国会监督官僚机构所需的信息,但许多人担心,议员们反而专注于通过抨击证人来获得政治分数。我们利用国会工作人员的集体判断来衡量立法者和证人之间的交流如何在两个可分离的维度上变化:信息和对抗。与对抗会排挤信息的传统观点相反,我们展示了总统所在政党的成员参与较少对抗性的监督,并没有比他们的同龄人透露更多或更少的信息。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Information and Confrontation in Legislative Oversight

Information and Confrontation in Legislative Oversight

Committees can use oversight hearings to collect and communicate the information Congress needs to oversee the bureaucracy, but many worry that members instead focus on scoring political points by lambasting witnesses. We leverage the collective judgment of congressional staff to measure how exchanges between legislators and witnesses vary on two separable dimensions: information and confrontation. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that confrontation crowds out information, we show that members of the president's party engage in less confrontational oversight and reveal no more or less information than their peers.

求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Legislative Studies Quarterly
Legislative Studies Quarterly POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
13.30%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: The Legislative Studies Quarterly is an international journal devoted to the publication of research on representative assemblies. Its purpose is to disseminate scholarly work on parliaments and legislatures, their relations to other political institutions, their functions in the political system, and the activities of their members both within the institution and outside. Contributions are invited from scholars in all countries. The pages of the Quarterly are open to all research approaches consistent with the normal canons of scholarship, and to work on representative assemblies in all settings and all time periods. The aim of the journal is to contribute to the formulation and verification of general theories about legislative systems, processes, and behavior.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信