Gonul Colak , Timo P. Korkeamäki , Niclas Oskar Meyer
{"title":"ESG与全球首席执行官更替","authors":"Gonul Colak , Timo P. Korkeamäki , Niclas Oskar Meyer","doi":"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102523","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We investigate whether CEOs around the world are held accountable for stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. The likelihood of CEO turnover increases significantly when the media coverage of the ESG incidents reaches extreme levels. CEO turnovers occur even in the cases where an incident does not lead to a stock price decline. In such cases, the board likely has a non-pecuniary motive for the turnover. This suggests that such non-pecuniary reputational concerns are an important determinant of CEO turnover decisions around the world, especially when the firm is facing intense public pressure due to stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. This effect is more pronounced when firms are headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries like many European countries.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":15525,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Corporate Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":7.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119923001724/pdfft?md5=106692a9942cb45c836e6147613c43cf&pid=1-s2.0-S0929119923001724-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"ESG and CEO turnover around the world\",\"authors\":\"Gonul Colak , Timo P. Korkeamäki , Niclas Oskar Meyer\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102523\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We investigate whether CEOs around the world are held accountable for stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. The likelihood of CEO turnover increases significantly when the media coverage of the ESG incidents reaches extreme levels. CEO turnovers occur even in the cases where an incident does not lead to a stock price decline. In such cases, the board likely has a non-pecuniary motive for the turnover. This suggests that such non-pecuniary reputational concerns are an important determinant of CEO turnover decisions around the world, especially when the firm is facing intense public pressure due to stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. This effect is more pronounced when firms are headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries like many European countries.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15525,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119923001724/pdfft?md5=106692a9942cb45c836e6147613c43cf&pid=1-s2.0-S0929119923001724-main.pdf\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Corporate Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119923001724\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Corporate Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119923001724","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
We investigate whether CEOs around the world are held accountable for stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. The likelihood of CEO turnover increases significantly when the media coverage of the ESG incidents reaches extreme levels. CEO turnovers occur even in the cases where an incident does not lead to a stock price decline. In such cases, the board likely has a non-pecuniary motive for the turnover. This suggests that such non-pecuniary reputational concerns are an important determinant of CEO turnover decisions around the world, especially when the firm is facing intense public pressure due to stakeholder-related corporate misbehavior. This effect is more pronounced when firms are headquartered in stakeholder-oriented countries like many European countries.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Corporate Finance aims to publish high quality, original manuscripts that analyze issues related to corporate finance. Contributions can be of a theoretical, empirical, or clinical nature. Topical areas of interest include, but are not limited to: financial structure, payout policies, corporate restructuring, financial contracts, corporate governance arrangements, the economics of organizations, the influence of legal structures, and international financial management. Papers that apply asset pricing and microstructure analysis to corporate finance issues are also welcome.