{"title":"法律风险与内幕交易","authors":"MARCIN KACPERCZYK, EMILIANO S. PAGNOTTA","doi":"10.1111/jofi.13299","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? We address this question with hand-collected data from 530 SEC (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) investigations. Using two plausibly exogenous shocks to expected penalties, we show that insiders trade less aggressively and earlier and concentrate on tips of greater value when facing a higher risk. The results match the predictions of a model where an insider internalizes the impact of trades on prices and the likelihood of prosecution and anticipates penalties in proportion to trade profits. Our findings lend support to the effectiveness of U.S. regulations' deterrence and the long-standing hypothesis that insider trading enforcement can hamper price informativeness.</p>","PeriodicalId":15753,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Finance","volume":"79 1","pages":"305-355"},"PeriodicalIF":7.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13299","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Legal Risk and Insider Trading\",\"authors\":\"MARCIN KACPERCZYK, EMILIANO S. PAGNOTTA\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jofi.13299\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? We address this question with hand-collected data from 530 SEC (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) investigations. Using two plausibly exogenous shocks to expected penalties, we show that insiders trade less aggressively and earlier and concentrate on tips of greater value when facing a higher risk. The results match the predictions of a model where an insider internalizes the impact of trades on prices and the likelihood of prosecution and anticipates penalties in proportion to trade profits. Our findings lend support to the effectiveness of U.S. regulations' deterrence and the long-standing hypothesis that insider trading enforcement can hamper price informativeness.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":15753,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Finance\",\"volume\":\"79 1\",\"pages\":\"305-355\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/jofi.13299\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.13299\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.13299","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? We address this question with hand-collected data from 530 SEC (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) investigations. Using two plausibly exogenous shocks to expected penalties, we show that insiders trade less aggressively and earlier and concentrate on tips of greater value when facing a higher risk. The results match the predictions of a model where an insider internalizes the impact of trades on prices and the likelihood of prosecution and anticipates penalties in proportion to trade profits. Our findings lend support to the effectiveness of U.S. regulations' deterrence and the long-standing hypothesis that insider trading enforcement can hamper price informativeness.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Finance is a renowned publication that disseminates cutting-edge research across all major fields of financial inquiry. Widely regarded as the most cited academic journal in finance, each issue reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, government entities, and financial institutions worldwide. Published bi-monthly, the journal serves as the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization dedicated to advancing knowledge and understanding in financial economics. Join us in exploring the forefront of financial research and scholarship.
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