{"title":"风险资本与企业金融化:来自中国的证据","authors":"Hongji Xie , Cunzhi Tian , Fangying Pang","doi":"10.1016/j.qref.2023.12.002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We examine whether and how venture capital investors (VCs) affect corporate financialization<span> in post-IPO stages using China’s A-share non-financial listed firms from 2007 to 2019. We find that the presence of VCs reduces the level of corporate financialization. The negative relationship is more pronounced in VCs with private ownership and portfolio firms with poor corporate governance. Further evidence shows that the negative effect of VCs on corporate financialization is driven by VCs through stronger corporate governance engagement, indicating a monitoring channel. We also find that VCs exhibit a high level of failure tolerance and innovation promotion by decreasing the sensitivity of CEO turnover to compensation performance, and promoting R&D investment in firms with a stronger arbitrage incentive, suggesting another innovation channel.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47962,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance","volume":"93 ","pages":"Pages 119-136"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Venture capital and corporate financialization: Evidence from China\",\"authors\":\"Hongji Xie , Cunzhi Tian , Fangying Pang\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.qref.2023.12.002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>We examine whether and how venture capital investors (VCs) affect corporate financialization<span> in post-IPO stages using China’s A-share non-financial listed firms from 2007 to 2019. We find that the presence of VCs reduces the level of corporate financialization. The negative relationship is more pronounced in VCs with private ownership and portfolio firms with poor corporate governance. Further evidence shows that the negative effect of VCs on corporate financialization is driven by VCs through stronger corporate governance engagement, indicating a monitoring channel. We also find that VCs exhibit a high level of failure tolerance and innovation promotion by decreasing the sensitivity of CEO turnover to compensation performance, and promoting R&D investment in firms with a stronger arbitrage incentive, suggesting another innovation channel.</span></p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47962,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance\",\"volume\":\"93 \",\"pages\":\"Pages 119-136\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-12-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976923001382\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062976923001382","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Venture capital and corporate financialization: Evidence from China
We examine whether and how venture capital investors (VCs) affect corporate financialization in post-IPO stages using China’s A-share non-financial listed firms from 2007 to 2019. We find that the presence of VCs reduces the level of corporate financialization. The negative relationship is more pronounced in VCs with private ownership and portfolio firms with poor corporate governance. Further evidence shows that the negative effect of VCs on corporate financialization is driven by VCs through stronger corporate governance engagement, indicating a monitoring channel. We also find that VCs exhibit a high level of failure tolerance and innovation promotion by decreasing the sensitivity of CEO turnover to compensation performance, and promoting R&D investment in firms with a stronger arbitrage incentive, suggesting another innovation channel.
期刊介绍:
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance (QREF) attracts and publishes high quality manuscripts that cover topics in the areas of economics, financial economics and finance. The subject matter may be theoretical, empirical or policy related. Emphasis is placed on quality, originality, clear arguments, persuasive evidence, intelligent analysis and clear writing. At least one Special Issue is published per year. These issues have guest editors, are devoted to a single theme and the papers have well known authors. In addition we pride ourselves in being able to provide three to four article "Focus" sections in most of our issues.