Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle

So-called Neo-Russellians, such as Salmon, Braun, Crimmins, and Perry, hold that the semantic content of ‘$n$ is $F$’ in a context $c$ is the singular proposition $⟨$o, P$⟩$, where $o$ is the referent of the name $n$ in $c$, and $P$ is the property expressed by the predicate $F$ in $c$. This is also known as the Neo-Russellian theory. Using truth ascriptions with names designating propositions, such as ‘Goldbach's conjecture’, in this paper, I will argue that, together with highly plausible principles regarding a priori knowledge, the Neo-Russellian theory leads to unacceptable consequences. I will call this ‘the Goldbach puzzle’. Since the solution to the Goldbach puzzle cannot be to reject the discussed principles regarding a priori knowledge, the puzzle will undermine the Neo-Russellian theory.