衡量羞耻和骄傲的福利效应

IF 10.5 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Luigi Butera, Robert Metcalfe, William Morrison, Dmitry Taubinsky
{"title":"衡量羞耻和骄傲的福利效应","authors":"Luigi Butera, Robert Metcalfe, William Morrison, Dmitry Taubinsky","doi":"10.1257/aer.20190433","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride— are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while low-performing individuals incur significant utility losses. We estimate structural models of social signaling, and we use the models to explore the social efficiency of public recognition policies. (JEL C93, D64, D82, D91)","PeriodicalId":48472,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":10.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Measuring the Welfare Effects of Shame and Pride\",\"authors\":\"Luigi Butera, Robert Metcalfe, William Morrison, Dmitry Taubinsky\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/aer.20190433\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride— are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while low-performing individuals incur significant utility losses. We estimate structural models of social signaling, and we use the models to explore the social efficiency of public recognition policies. (JEL C93, D64, D82, D91)\",\"PeriodicalId\":48472,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Review\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":10.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190433\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20190433","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

公众的认可经常被用来激励理想的行为,然而它的福利效应——比如羞耻的成本或骄傲的收益——却很少被衡量。我们开发了一种便携式的实证方法来测量和货币化社会形象效用,并将其应用于锻炼和慈善行为的实验中。在所有的实验中,公众的认可激发了理想的行为,但却产生了高度不平等的形象回报。高绩效个体享有显著的效用增益,而低绩效个体遭受显著的效用损失。我们估计了社会信号的结构模型,并利用这些模型来探讨公共认可政策的社会效率。(jel c93, d64, d82, d91)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Measuring the Welfare Effects of Shame and Pride
Public recognition is frequently used to motivate desirable behavior, yet its welfare effects—such as costs of shame or gains from pride— are rarely measured. We develop a portable empirical methodology for measuring and monetizing social image utility, and we deploy it in experiments on exercise and charitable behavior. In all experiments, public recognition motivates desirable behavior but creates highly unequal image payoffs. High-performing individuals enjoy significant utility gains, while low-performing individuals incur significant utility losses. We estimate structural models of social signaling, and we use the models to explore the social efficiency of public recognition policies. (JEL C93, D64, D82, D91)
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
18.60
自引率
2.80%
发文量
122
期刊介绍: The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信