权力错配与国内冲突:一个实证研究

IF 4.5 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Massimo Morelli, Laura Ogliari, Long Hong
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文的实证表明,一个族群的政治和军事力量之间的不平衡对于理解这个族群参与冲突的可能性至关重要。我们通过将机器学习技术与有关非洲和中东种族群体特征和内部冲突结果的丰富数据相结合,开发了一种衡量群体军事力量的新方法。我们将这一衡量标准与一个族裔群体政治权力的现有指标以及一个基于内阁成员族裔信息的新代理相结合。我们发现,根据所使用的规范,军事和政治权力之间高度不匹配的群体更有可能与政府发生冲突,其可能性在30%到50%之间。我们还发现,功率不匹配的影响是非线性的,这与考虑冲突成本的简单模型的预测一致。此外,我们的研究结果表明,高度不匹配的群体通常会卷入更大的中间冲突。其政策含义是,权力分享建议和和平体制设计政策应主要考虑减少相关群体之间的权力不匹配,而不是只注重孤立地平衡政治权力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Power Mismatch and Civil Conflict: An Empirical Investigation
This paper empirically shows that the imbalance between an ethnic group’s political and military power is crucial to understanding the likelihood that such a group engages in a conflict. We develop a novel measure of a group’s military power by combining machine learning techniques with rich data on ethnic group characteristics and outcomes of civil conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. We couple this measure with available indicators of an ethnic group’s political power as well as with a novel proxy based on information about the ethnicity of cabinet members. We find that groups characterized by a higher mismatch between military and political power are between 30% and 50% more likely to engage in a conflict against their government depending on the specification used. We also find that the effects of power mismatch are nonlinear, which is in agreement with the predictions of a simple model that accounts for the cost of conflict. Moreover, our results suggest that high-mismatched groups are typically involved in larger and centrist conflicts. The policy implication is that power-sharing recommendations and institutional design policies for peace should consider primarily the reduction of power mismatches between relevant groups, rather than focusing exclusively on equalizing political power in isolation.
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来源期刊
Economic Policy
Economic Policy ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Economic Policy provides timely and authoritative analyses of the choices confronting policymakers. The subject matter ranges from the study of how individual markets can and should work to the broadest interactions in the world economy. Economic Policy features: Analysis of key issues as they emerge Views of top international economists Frontier thinking without technical jargon Wide-reaching coverage of worldwide policy debate
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