中央银行设计改革的政治经济学:来自新数据集的证据

IF 4.5 3区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Davide Romelli
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如何解释过去50年世界范围内央行设计的变化?本文使用中央银行制度设计的新数据集,研究了1972-2017年期间154个国家改革的时间、速度和规模。我构建了一个新的中央银行独立性动态指数,并表明过去的独立性水平以及区域趋同是中央银行设计变化的重要驱动因素。外部压力,如获得国际货币基金组织贷款,或政治事件,如民主改革和民族主义政府的选举,也会影响改革进程。改革还伴随着高通胀率时期,这表明央行独立性的内生演变。研究结果还揭示了改革过程中重要的异质性,这取决于发展水平、改革的规模和方向,以及央行立法可以修改的不同维度。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset
What explains the worldwide changes in central bank design over the past five decades? Using a new dataset on central bank institutional design, this paper investigates the timing, pace and magnitude of reforms in a sample of 154 countries over the period 1972-2017. I construct a new dynamic index of central bank independence and show that past levels of independence, as well as regional convergence, represent important drivers of changes in central bank design. An external pressure, such as obtaining an IMF loan, or political events, such as democratic reforms and the election of nationalistic governments, also impact the reform process. Reforms also follow periods of high inflation rates suggesting an endogeneous evolution of central bank independence. The results also reveal important heterogeneities in the reform process depending on the level of development, the size and direction of reforms, as well as the different dimensions along which central bank legislation can be amended.
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来源期刊
Economic Policy
Economic Policy ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
4.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Economic Policy provides timely and authoritative analyses of the choices confronting policymakers. The subject matter ranges from the study of how individual markets can and should work to the broadest interactions in the world economy. Economic Policy features: Analysis of key issues as they emerge Views of top international economists Frontier thinking without technical jargon Wide-reaching coverage of worldwide policy debate
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