{"title":"中央银行设计改革的政治经济学:来自新数据集的证据","authors":"Davide Romelli","doi":"10.1093/epolic/eiac011","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What explains the worldwide changes in central bank design over the past five decades? Using a new dataset on central bank institutional design, this paper investigates the timing, pace and magnitude of reforms in a sample of 154 countries over the period 1972-2017. I construct a new dynamic index of central bank independence and show that past levels of independence, as well as regional convergence, represent important drivers of changes in central bank design. An external pressure, such as obtaining an IMF loan, or political events, such as democratic reforms and the election of nationalistic governments, also impact the reform process. Reforms also follow periods of high inflation rates suggesting an endogeneous evolution of central bank independence. The results also reveal important heterogeneities in the reform process depending on the level of development, the size and direction of reforms, as well as the different dimensions along which central bank legislation can be amended.","PeriodicalId":47772,"journal":{"name":"Economic Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset\",\"authors\":\"Davide Romelli\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/epolic/eiac011\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"What explains the worldwide changes in central bank design over the past five decades? Using a new dataset on central bank institutional design, this paper investigates the timing, pace and magnitude of reforms in a sample of 154 countries over the period 1972-2017. I construct a new dynamic index of central bank independence and show that past levels of independence, as well as regional convergence, represent important drivers of changes in central bank design. An external pressure, such as obtaining an IMF loan, or political events, such as democratic reforms and the election of nationalistic governments, also impact the reform process. Reforms also follow periods of high inflation rates suggesting an endogeneous evolution of central bank independence. The results also reveal important heterogeneities in the reform process depending on the level of development, the size and direction of reforms, as well as the different dimensions along which central bank legislation can be amended.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47772,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Economic Policy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Economic Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiac011\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economic Policy","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/epolic/eiac011","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset
What explains the worldwide changes in central bank design over the past five decades? Using a new dataset on central bank institutional design, this paper investigates the timing, pace and magnitude of reforms in a sample of 154 countries over the period 1972-2017. I construct a new dynamic index of central bank independence and show that past levels of independence, as well as regional convergence, represent important drivers of changes in central bank design. An external pressure, such as obtaining an IMF loan, or political events, such as democratic reforms and the election of nationalistic governments, also impact the reform process. Reforms also follow periods of high inflation rates suggesting an endogeneous evolution of central bank independence. The results also reveal important heterogeneities in the reform process depending on the level of development, the size and direction of reforms, as well as the different dimensions along which central bank legislation can be amended.
期刊介绍:
Economic Policy provides timely and authoritative analyses of the choices confronting policymakers. The subject matter ranges from the study of how individual markets can and should work to the broadest interactions in the world economy. Economic Policy features: Analysis of key issues as they emerge Views of top international economists Frontier thinking without technical jargon Wide-reaching coverage of worldwide policy debate