{"title":"存在与时间的三种“基本欺骗”:重新审视海德格尔的现象学","authors":"David Charles Abergel","doi":"10.1163/15691640-12341524","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In his private notes written in 1936 (now published as <jats:sc>GA82</jats:sc>), Heidegger enumerates three “fundamental deceptions” at play in <jats:italic>Being and Time</jats:italic> (1927). The thrust of these deceptions is twofold: that Dasein is something given and that the task of phenomenology is to describe Dasein in its givenness. These are deceptions, Heidegger claims in 1936, because Dasein is not something given, but can only be reached in a leap, and because the task of phenomenology is not to describe Dasein in its givenness, but to bring about Dasein and the “there,” the site of Being’s happening, through a creative leap-in. Scholars might be inclined to read these deceptions as further evidence for the view that Heidegger in the 1930s abandons phenomenology understood as a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness. This paper argues, to the contrary, that phenomenology for the young Heidegger was never a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness, but always, however obliquely presented throughout the 1920s, a way of participating in the creative unfolding of the site of Being’s happening.","PeriodicalId":44158,"journal":{"name":"RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Three “Fundamental Deceptions” of Being and Time: Heidegger’s Phenomenology Revisited\",\"authors\":\"David Charles Abergel\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/15691640-12341524\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In his private notes written in 1936 (now published as <jats:sc>GA82</jats:sc>), Heidegger enumerates three “fundamental deceptions” at play in <jats:italic>Being and Time</jats:italic> (1927). The thrust of these deceptions is twofold: that Dasein is something given and that the task of phenomenology is to describe Dasein in its givenness. These are deceptions, Heidegger claims in 1936, because Dasein is not something given, but can only be reached in a leap, and because the task of phenomenology is not to describe Dasein in its givenness, but to bring about Dasein and the “there,” the site of Being’s happening, through a creative leap-in. Scholars might be inclined to read these deceptions as further evidence for the view that Heidegger in the 1930s abandons phenomenology understood as a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness. This paper argues, to the contrary, that phenomenology for the young Heidegger was never a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness, but always, however obliquely presented throughout the 1920s, a way of participating in the creative unfolding of the site of Being’s happening.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44158,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY\",\"volume\":\"7 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341524\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"RESEARCH IN PHENOMENOLOGY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/15691640-12341524","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Three “Fundamental Deceptions” of Being and Time: Heidegger’s Phenomenology Revisited
In his private notes written in 1936 (now published as GA82), Heidegger enumerates three “fundamental deceptions” at play in Being and Time (1927). The thrust of these deceptions is twofold: that Dasein is something given and that the task of phenomenology is to describe Dasein in its givenness. These are deceptions, Heidegger claims in 1936, because Dasein is not something given, but can only be reached in a leap, and because the task of phenomenology is not to describe Dasein in its givenness, but to bring about Dasein and the “there,” the site of Being’s happening, through a creative leap-in. Scholars might be inclined to read these deceptions as further evidence for the view that Heidegger in the 1930s abandons phenomenology understood as a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness. This paper argues, to the contrary, that phenomenology for the young Heidegger was never a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness, but always, however obliquely presented throughout the 1920s, a way of participating in the creative unfolding of the site of Being’s happening.
期刊介绍:
Research in Phenomenology deals with phenomenological philosophy in a broad sense, including original phenomenological research, critical and interpretative studies of major phenomenological thinkers, studies relating phenomenological philosophy to other disciplines, and historical studies of special relevance to phenomenological philosophy.