Consecutive decentralization: The effect of central bank independence on capital account liberalization

Central bank independence (CBI) has been widely advocated as a means to address the time-inconsistency problem of controlling inflation. Consequently, many countries have embraced central bank reforms since the 1990s. While extant research in political science has sought to unveil the consequences of CBI, there remains an unexplained variation in the response of countries with regard to capital account openness. Notably, a positive association exists between CBI and capital account openness due to the constraints CBI places on leaders' discretionary monetary and fiscal policies, thereby fostering reliance on financial policy to boost their economies. However, this relationship is contingent on the domestic political contexts of countries. CBI leads to capital account liberalization only when the rule of law is guaranteed, given that CBI is often stipulated by laws. Therefore, in countries where political leaders can easily override formal rules, CBI shows no discernible impact on capital account openness. Employing two-way fixed-effects and error-correction models, the study reveals that CBI increases capital account openness only in democracies, in the presence of multiple veto players, and a high level of transparency. The findings underscore the pivotal role of the domestic political environment in analyzing how CBI constrains political leaders.